

**THE ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA:  
A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS**

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by

**PALITHA RUWAN WANIGASOORIYA, MAJ, SRI LANKA ARMY**

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Major P. Ruwan Wanigasooriya, Sri Lanka Army

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This study investigates the causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka from a civilizational point of view using as a base line the studies by Dr. Samuel P. Huntington. Sri Lanka, a large island in the Indian ocean, has been engulfed by a separatist guerrilla war since the early 1980s. The armed campaign launched by the rebels, mainly Tamil-Hindus, against the government, dominated by Sinhala-Buddhists, is aimed at establishing a separate state in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The study documents the root causes and analyzes the civilizational aspects of this conflict.

Research demonstrates the conflict as a "clash of civilizations." Although the two groups in conflict, Sinhala-Buddhists and Tamil-Hindus, share two different cultures they do not appear to have had distinct identities until they came into contact with a completely alien Western civilization. With the European dominance in the region since the sixteenth century, Sinhalese and Tamils started establishing identities with the motive of preventing their absorption by the Western civilization. This resulted in friction between the Sinhala and Tamil people.

This study identifies the "clash of civilizations" in Sri Lanka and suggests that this conflict could be resolved by addressing the civilizational aspects of the two groups involved in conflict.

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
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
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
 Thesis Committee Chairman  
LTC Marvin A. Chandler, M.S.

 Member  
LCDR Scott A. Hastings, M.A., M.M.A.S., E.M.B.A.

 Member  
Mr. Stuart D. Lyon, M.P.A.

 Member, Consulting Faculty  
LTC James C. McNaughton, Ph.D.

Accepted on this 6th day of June 1997 by:

 Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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## ABSTRACT

### THE ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA: A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

by Major P. Ruwan Wanigasooriya, Sri Lanka Army, 83 pages.

This study investigates the causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka from a civilizational point of view using as a baseline the studies by Dr. Samuel P. Huntington. Sri Lanka, a large island in the Indian ocean, has been engulfed by a separatist guerrilla war since the early 1980s. The armed campaign launched by the rebels, mainly Tamil-Hindus, against the government, dominated by Sinhala-Buddhists, is aimed at establishing a separate state in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The study documents the root causes and analyzes the civilizational aspects of this conflict.

Research demonstrates the conflict as a "clash of civilizations." Although the two groups in conflict, Sinhala-Buddhists and Tamil-Hindus, share two different cultures they do not appear to have had distinct identities until they came into contact with a completely alien Western civilization. With the European dominance in the region since the sixteenth century, Sinhalese and Tamils started establishing identities with the motive of preventing their absorption by the western civilization. This resulted in friction between the Sinhala and Tamil people.

This study identifies the "clash of civilizations" in Sri Lanka and suggests that this conflict could be resolved by addressing the civilizational aspects of the two groups involved in conflict.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka, better known as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean, is an island nation with a history of over 2,500 years, one of the oldest continuous documented histories in the world. The island occupies a spot on the world map that stretches roughly from six to ten degrees north latitude and eighty to eighty-two degrees east longitude,<sup>1</sup> and thirty-two kilometers southeast of India. It measures 25,332 square miles (65,610 sq. kms)<sup>2</sup> and has a population of over seventeen million. (See Appendix A, Fig. 1.)

The island has one of the most complex, plural societies in any part of the world.<sup>3</sup> There are two if not three distinct ethnic groups in the island: Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims.<sup>4</sup> Four of the world's main religions, namely Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam, are found in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese constitute the majority with 74 percent of the population. Sinhalese Buddhists constitute just over two-thirds or 69.3 percent of the population. Sri Lankan Tamils constitute 12.7 percent of the population. Indian Tamils constitute 5.5 percent of the population. The total Hindu population amounts to 15.5 percent of the total population and is shared among these last two groups.<sup>5</sup> (See Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2.)

Tension among different ethnic groups in the country has existed, especially between the two major ethnic groups, that is, Sinhalese and Tamils, over a considerable period of time. Roots of the conflict can be traced several centuries back in history. Since 1983 the armed conflict between the Sinhala-dominant government and Tamil terrorism and sabotage

accompanied by massacres have claimed more than 45,000 lives. This conflict has become one of the bloodiest conflicts in South Asia.

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington argues in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not primarily be ideological or economical, but the great division and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. "Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors."<sup>6</sup> He further argues that: "The world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest danger for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations."<sup>7</sup> While recognizing the term *civilization* in the singular, his main concern in this book is the term *civilizations* in the plural.<sup>8</sup>

### Research Question

The primary question attempted to answer by this research is: "Does the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka validate Huntington's thesis as presented in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*?" In answering this question, the thesis will also address the following subordinate questions.

1. Can Sri Lanka be categorized as a "*cleft country*"?<sup>9</sup>
2. What are the roots of the conflict? Are they civilizational?
3. Why did the democratic process fail to bring about a solution? Will the proposed constitutional amendments address the key issues?



### Background

Being located in close proximity to India, her influence is clearly evident throughout the history of Sri Lanka. According to *Mahawamsa*, the country's history book, an Indian prince named Vijaya with his associates explored the island twenty-five centuries ago. They overpowered the existing *Yakka* tribe and began the Sinhalese civilization. The prince belonged to the Aryan race. Since his father, Sinhabahu, had slain a lion, the prince and his followers were called "Sinhala"<sup>10</sup> (in Sinhala language, lion is called *sinha*, hence the name "Sinhalese" for their descendants). These original settlers were North Indians. Most authorities on the island's history believe that they came from either or both of the states of Gujerat and Bengal. The roots of the culture and civilization are thus Indian, but they have also been deeply influenced in recent times by other cultures as well, namely Portuguese and English and to a lesser extent Dutch. There have always been strong cultural and religious ties between Sinhalese, Burmese, and Thai, through their common religion: Buddhism.<sup>11</sup> Due to its location in the sea route between East and West, the country had been an attraction to many sea-going nations, resulting in a multi dimensional culture.

Huntington identifies religion as the most important of all the objective elements which define civilizations.<sup>12</sup> According to him of the five "world religions, four--Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism--are associated with major civilizations. The fifth, Buddhism, is not."<sup>13</sup> He argues that "Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization."<sup>14</sup> In Sri Lanka, however, Sinhalese identify themselves along with their religion, Buddhism, while the Tamils identify with Hinduism.

From its early days in the sixth century B.C. until 1815, Sri Lanka had been ruled by Sri Lankan kings or queens. Then the British, who for some time had been controlling the maritime

areas, defeated the reigning king to take complete control of the country. Prior to that, the maritime areas had in fact been colonized by the Portuguese in 1505, followed by the Dutch in 1652, and by the British in 1796. During those years the rest of the country continued to be ruled by the Sri Lankan king, who had his capital, Kandy, in the central region.<sup>15</sup>

From the early third century B.C. Sri Lanka had been subjected to occasional invasions by Indian forces.<sup>16</sup> The majority of these forces had been Dravidians (Tamils) in ethnicity and belonged to the Tamil-Hindu civilization of South India. Those invasions had contributed towards an increase in the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, when thousands of soldiers opted to settle in this country after each invasion. Apart from those Tamil soldiers, many more other Dravidians from south India were recruited by Sinhalese kings as mercenaries in their armies.<sup>17</sup> They too made Sri Lanka their home. In addition to both these categories, there had also been Tamils who had migrated from South India for the purpose of trade or to explore the "greener grass" of the beautiful island.

In the early years the Tamils and the Sinhalese lived in relative harmony in the northwestern and northcentral regions of the island. There are numerous occasions of intermarriage and merger among the two groups. However, throughout history the majority of these two groups had adhered to their respective culture and language (i.e., Sinhalese: Sinhala language and traditions enriched by Buddhism; and Tamils: Tamil language and traditions enriched by Hinduism).

History illustrates a number of Indian invasions and battles fought between Sri Lankan and Indian forces. In the thirteenth century a massive invasion force from the Indian Deccan territories invaded Sri Lanka. The result of these invasions was the separation of Sinhalese and Tamils who lived in the north central areas of the island. The Sinhalese moved to the south and

the Tamils moved towards the northern region, to the Jaffna peninsula, to escape the brutal massacre by Indian forces. Even after North Indian forces withdrew from those areas, the Sinhalese and Tamils remained in their new areas, and the previously occupied areas were gradually encompassed by jungle habitat.<sup>18</sup> This separated the two ethnic groups.<sup>19</sup>

After the British took over, they divided the country into nine administrative provinces, which remain so even today. This division was done on the basis of easy administration on the recommendations made by the regional administrative authorities.<sup>20</sup> However, the later demands for a separate state by Tamils are based on these divisions that took effect in the late nineteenth century. Sinhalese reject these demands for a separate state. They argue that the claims made by the Tamils of the existence of a separate kingdom prior to the sixteenth century is a myth. The Sinhalese reinforce their argument with the fact that the boundaries of the sixteenth century kingdom claimed by the Tamils fall along the lines of the divisional boundaries drawn by the British in the nineteenth century. The Tamils demand a merger of the northern and eastern provinces and the establishment of a separate administration. (See Appendix A, Figs. 2, 3, and 4.)

There is little or no evidence of clashes between Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils during the centuries of rule by Sri Lankan royalty. A considerable degree of polarization of each ethnic group emerged when the two groups were separated during the North Indian invasion of the thirteenth century. Yet, Sri Lankan kings continued to rule the country, including the eastern and northern areas except for a brief period from the thirteenth century to early part of the seventeenth century, when an independent kingdom was established in the island's northern extremity, Jaffna peninsula.<sup>21</sup> The kingdom of Jaffna did not survive long and succumbed to

Portuguese expansion in the island's coastal region. Since then it was continually ruled by colonial rulers until Sri Lanka's independence in 1948.

There are two distinct Tamil groups in the country. Sri Lanka or Jaffna Tamils are mainly descended from people who arrived in the island well over fifteen centuries ago.<sup>22</sup> When the Jaffna peninsula began to become over crowded, and also due to the caste problem which had surfaced within, some drifted southward along the coastal area of the east and the west of the island.<sup>23</sup> In addition to this internal migration of Sri Lankan Tamils, during the British rule in the recent times, thousands of Indian Tamils from South India were brought to the country to work on the plantations. They are known as Indian Tamils. Indian Tamils are mainly concentrated in the central regions of the island, where tea and rubber plantations flourished. These two Tamil groups do not have much in common except their religion and language. Both groups are mainly Hindu, but the rigors of the Hindu caste system have generally kept them apart, the bulk of the plantation workers being regarded as "low" caste by the Sri Lankan or Jaffna Tamil elite. While there is no convergence of political attitudes and objectives between these two groups, Indian Tamil leaders have openly supported the political aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamil separatists, a support that stops short of endorsing the demand for a separate state.<sup>24</sup> The most significant fact about the geographical distribution of Tamils in the island is that 47 percent of the total Tamil population live in predominantly Sinhalese areas of the country.<sup>25</sup> (See Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2.)

Although Sinhalese Buddhists constitute the majority of the island, they are all too conscious of their minority status when compared with the Tamils of Southern Asia. This consciousness has been fueled by the island's location off the coast of the Tamil-dominated southern Indian state, Tamil Nadu. The Tamils of South Asia--of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka--

outnumber the Sinhalese by more than four to one.<sup>26</sup> Sinhalese have a "sense of historical destiny, of a small and embattled people who have preserved *Theravada* Buddhism when it was obliterated in southern India under a Hindu revivalist tide."<sup>27</sup> The Sinhalese sense of ethnic distinctiveness is identified through religion--Theravada Buddhism--and language--Sinhala. The Sinhala language has its roots in classical Indian languages, but now it is distinctly a Sri Lankan language that is not spoken anywhere else in the world.<sup>28</sup>

A serious consciousness of each other's ethnicity could be said to have surfaced during colonial rule, particularly in the spheres of employment and state appointments.<sup>29</sup> The Tamils immensely benefited from a higher standard of educational facilities established by missionaries in the Jaffna peninsula. The Western oriented education placed Tamils well in the colonial government's administrative mechanism. The domination of the government's employment sector by the Tamils was clearly evident even after independence. (See Appendix C, Tables 3-9.) The Sinhalese considered this unfair, as serving the minority with a bigger spoon. This feeling naturally created among the majority Sinhalese, particularly after Sri Lanka gained independence, a strong desire to rectify the anomaly. As would have been expected, the Sinhalese desire to rectify the anomaly and establish a system where everything would be shared according to proportional representation, brought about protests from the Tamils. The actions taken by Sinhalese-dominated governments to regain lost privileges contributed to the creation of solid ethnic postures by both communities.

Shortly after independence, the Sinhalese government disenfranchised the Indian Tamils, who had been brought by the British during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to work in the plantations. Eight years later in 1956, the Sinhala language was made the official language of the country. The latter actions produced widespread protests and demonstrations among the

Tamils and eventually led to the communal riots of 1958.<sup>30</sup> Between 1970 and 1973, the government introduced a standardization in the admission of students to the universities based on the regional representation of examination results. Tamils claimed this system was positively disadvantageous to them. Also introduced was a new Sri Lankan constitution with total sovereignty from the British Commonwealth. Tamil political leaders rejected this, mainly because it entrenched the Sinhala language as the official language and gave Buddhism a foremost place among religions.

Between 1957 and 1976 several attempts were made by the Sinhalese and Tamils to find a solution to the ethnic problem. None of these attempts proved successful. Consequently, on 14 May 1976, the Tamil political leaders met at Vaddukkodai, in the northern province of Sri Lanka, to examine the position of Tamils and to decide on their future. Initially, those Tamil leaders established the identity of grievances of the Tamils: deprivation of Indian Tamils of citizenship and franchise; the language policy; state-planned colonization of Tamil areas; giving Buddhism the foremost place under the constitution; denial of equal opportunity to Tamils in employment and education; the systematic cutting off of Sri Lankan Tamils from the mainstream of Tamil culture in South India; permitting and unleashing communal violence against Tamils; terrorizing, torturing and imprisoning Tamil youth; and imposing an unacceptable constitution on the Tamils. These were identified as the main elements of deprivation. Thereafter, those Tamil leaders resolved, that "the restoration and reconstruction of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Ealam based on the right of self determination inherent in every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country."<sup>31</sup>

The Sri Lankan government, in a move to address some of the problems, adopted a new constitution in 1978. It provided for Tamil as a national language, but was claimed by the Tamils to be ineffective because there was little effort to implement it. By the early 1980s the confidence that the Tamils had in their political leaders had begun to thaw. Simultaneously Tamil militant youth groups emerged, all sharing the common objective of achieving a separate state of Tamil Ealam in the north and east of Sri Lanka. However, the Tamil people were reluctant to support these groups until 1983, which was the turning point of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.<sup>32</sup>

In July 1983, following the death of thirteen soldiers in a terrorist land mine explosion, communal violence broke out in the country. Countrywide attacks on Tamils, characterized by massacres and destruction, created a mass exodus of Tamils seeking refuge abroad. Even in Sri Lanka itself, a large number of Tamils were reduced to a condition of refugees. Those attacks also induced Tamil youth to join the militant groups, which vastly expanded. Moreover additional militant groups emerged. By 1985 there were around thirty-five of them. The 1983 attacks on Tamils brought about angry reactions in India,<sup>33</sup> whose population included over 50 million Tamils who shared many commonalities with Sri Lankan Tamils. India began to militarily train and arm Tamil militant groups of Sri Lanka and also to assist them in other ways. Since then the fighting between the government forces and the rebel groups continued. The rebel groups fought each other for dominance and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) emerged victorious and the only force to be reckoned with.

Since 1984 the government has made several attempts to bring about a peaceful solution to this conflict. Namely: Thimpu Talks; the Delhi Accord; All Parties Conference; the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord; the Sri Lanka Government-LTTE Peace Talks in 1990; and the Sri Lanka

Government-LTTE Peace Talks in 1995.<sup>34</sup> All these efforts made by successive governments were unsuccessful at solving the problem, mainly due to the firm stand taken by the rebel groups to settle for nothing else but a separate state. The Tamil rebels claim northern and eastern provinces as their traditional homelands and demand a separate state. This area covers about a third of the island's total land area and two-thirds of its coast line, including Trincomalee, the best deep water harbor in the region.<sup>35</sup> (See Appendix A, Fig. 4.)

In August 1995 the present government proposed a solution that calls for devolution of power to the regions. This is a giant step ahead of the previous proposals. The government's peace proposals would turn the country into a federation of regions, granting autonomy not only to the Tamils of the northern and eastern provinces but also to the Sinhalese majority elsewhere in the country. One of the most striking points is the merger of the northern and eastern provinces, which is a prominent demand of the Tamils, after a re-demarcation of the existing provincial boundaries. By these proposals, control over sensitive subjects, such as land, law and order, education, local government, housing and construction, agriculture, and industrial development would be granted to the regions while the central government in Colombo would retain control over defense, national security, foreign affairs, international economic relations, and national media.<sup>36</sup>

Many Tamil political parties had expressed their feelings in favor of the government's proposals while some had reserved their opinion. The LTTE rejected these proposals outright and showed it by exploding a bomb in Colombo killing twenty two people and injuring many others.<sup>37</sup> There is considerable resistance from the majority of Sinhalese too. They fear that these proposals might lead to divide the country "into nine states."<sup>38</sup> The country's main opposition party has remained noncommittal on the proposals.



The economic management of the country has become a complicated problem due to the eruption of the internal conflict.<sup>39</sup> This has led to a sharp rise in the defense expenditure. Foreign investments, essential for development of a country like Sri Lanka, have declined considerably. The economic growth has been badly affected, resulting in many problems, such as lack of employment, decline in the gross domestic product (GDP), a shattered stock market, etc. The tourist industry, which had been one of the most important economic resources, has also been very badly affected. Sabotage by the terrorists has caused severe damage to the basic infrastructure. These and many other factors have resulted in an increased inflation and the lack of economic growth.

### Definitions

Sinhalese. The ethnic group claims an Indo-Aryan origin and speaks the Sinhala language, which has its roots in classic Indian languages, but is clearly distinctive. This language is not spoken anywhere else in the world. The majority are Buddhists (93.5 percent), and minor percentages follow all other religions existing in the island.

Tamils. The ethnic group speaks the Tamil language, which is identical to the language spoken by Tamils all over the world. They claim to be Dravidian in origin. There are two groups of Tamils on the island.

Sri Lankan Tamils. The group whose majority lives in the northern and eastern parts of the island. They have a long history (about 1,500 years) in the island. The majority follows Hinduism (80.7 percent) and minor percentages follow all other religions existing in the island.

Indian Tamils. The group whose majority lives in the plantations in the central parts of the country. Their history in the island begins in the nineteenth century. They were

brought to Sri Lanka by the British to work in plantations. The majority follow Hinduism (90.9 percent), and minor percentages follow all other religions existing in the country.

Moors. The descendants of West Asian Arab migrants who came to the island for trade. They have a long history in the island. The majority of them are Muslims (92.6 percent). Minor percentages follow all other religions existing on the island. They speak Sinhalese, Tamil, and English languages depending on the area where they live. About 95 percent of them speak Arabic within the community. The Muslims constitute 8 percent of the total Sri Lankan population.

Ethnic Conflict. The prolonged conflict between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan Tamil rebels, triggered by the motive of establishing a separate country. Although Indian Tamil leaders (in Sri Lanka) express their support to the Tamil cause, they do not openly support establishment of a separate state.<sup>40</sup> Some prominent Tamil leaders in India have openly expressed their support.

Rebel. Any person who refuses to recognize the territorial integrity and the legitimacy of the democratically elected government of Sri Lanka. Such people in the Tamil community have launched an armed struggle with the aim of establishing a separate state they call "Tamil Ealam."

Rebellion. The organized armed struggle since early 1980s by Tamil groups against the lawfully constituted government with the aim of establishing a separate state.

Terrorist. A person involved in the political use of the violence of any magnitude and intimidation in Sri Lanka with the aim of dividing the country and establishing a separate state.

Security Forces. Armed forces representing the government of Sri Lanka, that is, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Police.

### Limitations and Delimitations

The research will be limited to published sources and the authors personal experience on the subject. Independent publications on the subject are very limited. There is a considerable amount of literature published by sympathizers of the two factions, projecting the interests of each group. This has to be given due consideration throughout the research. The ethnic problem has its roots spread deeply into the country's history. The amount of conflicting facts throughout history is overwhelming. Therefore, the research of historical facts beyond the nineteenth century will be limited to the most important prominent events.

Huntington discusses the "Nature of Civilizations" under six "propositions."<sup>41</sup> In this research the author explores only four, namely, civilizations in the plural sense, civilization as a "cultural entity," "civilizations are comprehensive" and the "civilizations are mortal but also very long lived."

### Significance of the Study

The Sri Lankan problem serves as a classic example of an ethnic conflict in the developing third world countries. The study will bring into focus the causes and possible solutions to the problems based on cultural, thus civilizational differences. The study will also focus on Samuel P. Huntington's theories presented in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*<sup>42</sup> and evaluate their validity in predicting the patterns of the "fault line conflicts"<sup>43</sup> in the future.

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<sup>1</sup>Herbert Keuneman, *Insight Guides: Sri Lanka*, ed. John Gottberg Anderson and Ravindralal Anthonis (Singapore: Apa Publications (HK) Ltd, 1996), 25.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution* (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 1996), 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Central Bank Printing Press, 1995), 6-10.

<sup>6</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 36.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>9</sup>Huntington, 137.

<sup>10</sup>R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, "The People of the Lion: Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography," in *Sri Lanka the History and the Roots of conflict*, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York: Routledge, 1990), 49.

<sup>11</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, 4.

<sup>12</sup>Huntington, 42.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>15</sup>Sri Lanka Army, *Sri Lanka-Brief Facets of Its Ethnic Conflict* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Army Head Quarters publication, 1996), 2. (Cited hereafter as Sri Lanka Army publication).

<sup>16</sup>Gunawardana, 58.

<sup>17</sup>Anton Muttukumaru, *The military history of Ceylon* (New Delhi, India: Navrang, 1987), 31.

<sup>18</sup>Sri Lanka Army publication, 3.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 45.

<sup>21</sup>K. M. de Silva, *The Traditional Homelands of the Tamils: Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka-A Historical Appraisal* (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 1994), 14.

<sup>22</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, 4.

<sup>23</sup>Sri Lanka Army publication, 3.

<sup>24</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, 5.

<sup>25</sup>S. J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 12.

<sup>26</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, 9.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>Jonathan Spencer, "Introduction: The Power of the Past," in *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of the Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 1.

<sup>30</sup>Elizebeth Nissan and R. L. Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities" in *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of the Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 35.

<sup>31</sup>A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii press, 1988), 88-89.

<sup>32</sup>Sri Lanka Army publication, 5.

<sup>33</sup>Wilson, 175.

<sup>34</sup>Sri Lanka Army publication, 6.

<sup>35</sup>Manik de Silva, "Sri Lanka: Looser Reign," *Far Eastern Economic Review* Aug 17, 1995, 17.

<sup>36</sup>Embassy of Sri Lanka, *News Release: Proposal on Devolution of Power*, (<http://wheat.symgrp.com/symgrp/srilanka/embassy>, 1997). This Internet Web Page contains all relevant documents of the devolution of power proposals published by the Sri Lankan government in 1995.

<sup>37</sup>Manik de Silva.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup>Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report 1995*, (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Central Bank Printing Press, 1996), 15.

<sup>40</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, 5.

<sup>41</sup>Huntington, 40.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 207-208.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has become a severe regional problem if not a global problem, resulting in a considerable amount of literature. Although a number of books have been published on this problem, there is a lack of independent studies conducted by neutral individuals and organizations. The majority of the available literature is works of either Sinhalese or Tamil scholars projecting and promoting the interests of the group they represent. Hence most of the literature seems to be biased towards one side or the other. However, basic facts remain true and valid for study irrespective of their interpretation. A few prominent publications on the problem have been selected for this review. The review is conducted under four categories, that is, historical background, Tamil perspective of the problem, Sinhalese perspective of the problem, and the perspective of seemingly neutral individuals.

There are many accounts of the island's history. *Mahawamsa* or the great chronicle of Ceylon, translated by Wilhelm Geiger (1950), stands as one of the most important history books of the country.<sup>1</sup> This book, initially written in the *Pali* language by Buddhist monks of different eras and handed down the line, contains a continuous history of the country from the inception. Anton Muttukumaru's *The Military History of Ceylon-An Outline* (1987) is the only book published on military history of the country.<sup>2</sup> Although he does not probe into details of history, the book provides a general account of historical occurrences with regards to military matters. E. F. C. Lodowyk in *The Modern History of Ceylon* (1966)<sup>3</sup> and Sir Charles Jeffreys in *Ceylon:*

*The Path to Independence* (1963)<sup>4</sup> provide important accounts of the island's history during the British rule. These books are very significant as they provide detailed accounts on different stages of the political transformation of the country into a democracy. James Jupp's *Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy* (1978) is a valuable source of the political history of the island since its independence in 1948.<sup>5</sup> The author, being a foreign scholar, has been able to strike an excellent balance in his study of politics. He examines the complicated interplay of political forces during successive changes of government.

Many books have been published from the Tamil point of view of the problem, attempting to establish the "Sri Lankan Tamil Identity." *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity* (1994), edited by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, explores the issue of Tamils' identity, bringing out historical, sociological, political, and geographical perspectives of the problem.<sup>6</sup> It also tries to establish the historical origins of Sri Lankan Tamils and discusses the impact of the colonial rule, caste system practiced by Tamils, and the government's land policy on the ethnic problem. Somasundaram Vanniasingham in *Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within* (1989) gives another dimension of the Tamil perspective.<sup>7</sup> The author, an economist, examines the Sri Lankan ethnic issue from the historical, legal, and constitutional angle. He supports the establishment of a separate state, and thus portrays an extremely biased view of the conflict. A. Jayaratnam Wilson, a professor of political science, in his book *Break-up of Sri Lanka* (1988)<sup>8</sup> makes a broad assumption that the country has already split into two entities. Based on his assumption, he deals with political issues. His close association with the political leaders representing both ethnic groups and his involvement in the government's efforts to resolve the conflict during the late 1970s and early 1980s adds value to his studies. *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas* (1994) by M. R. Narayan Swamy is a valuable source of information on the



development of militant groups.<sup>9</sup> He has been able to capture the Tamil militant mentality through extensive research conducted in the north and east of the country. He also covers in detail India's role in the evolution of these militant groups. The author's background as an independent Indian journalist has paid its dividends.

Historian K. M. de Silva's contribution to the field of literature on this conflict is invaluable. He represents the Sinhalese perspective. De Silva's book *The Traditional Home Lands of the Tamils, Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka-A Historical Appraisal* (1994) illustrates the myths and realities of the Tamils' claims for a separate state.<sup>10</sup> He revisits the beginning of the English rule over the island and challenges the Tamils' claim of a separate state. The book titled *Regional Powers and Small States Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90* (1995), by the same author gives a detailed account of the Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan affairs over the question of Tamil separatism in the north and the east of the island.<sup>11</sup> W. A. Wiswa Warnapala in his study *Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka* (1994) investigates the Tamil demands and the response by the Sinhala-dominated government.<sup>12</sup> It provides a good reference to the political aspects of the problem, specially since independence.

Among the few independent studies published on the conflict, *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict* (1990) edited by Jonathan Spencer occupies a prominent place.<sup>13</sup> It is a fine collection of articles written by different people of different backgrounds, such as social anthropology and history, giving a seemingly neutral opinion on the problem. *Only Man is Vile* (1992) by William McGowan probes social and political aspects of the country in the recent past, based on the hypothesis that the current fighting is rooted less in an ancient rivalry between two people than in the cultural and social wounds inflicted by the British colonialism.<sup>14</sup> David Little in his *Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (1994) examines the role religions play in the

conflict.<sup>15</sup> He also examines possible measures to reduce the levels of tension and violence in the country. His book especially addresses the political, legal, and nongovernmental effort at reconciliation and the prospects for a settlement. His perception of the ethnic conflict is seemingly extremist but worth studying.

Apart from these published sources there is a considerable amount of literature available on the Internet. The Sri Lanka home page, Sri Lanka web site in the USA, and Sri Lanka web site in the UK are some of the sources. The Internet is useful in obtaining current news and the international perspective of the problem, but the information has to be carefully validated before use. International news magazines, newspapers, and news services and their home pages/archives on the internet too serve as significant sources of information. *The Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka* published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka provides accurate official statistics of the country and is a helpful guide for any research on Sri Lanka.

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* serves as the cornerstone of this research.<sup>16</sup> Dr. Huntington poses the question whether conflict between civilizations would dominate the future of world politics. He shows convincingly how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace. According to him, world politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines, with new patterns of conflict and cooperation replacing those of the Cold War. He has also identified Sri Lanka as a place where fault lines between civilizations exist. His controversial theory would give a whole new dimension to conflict analysis in the future.

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<sup>1</sup>*The Mahawamsa*, or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon, translated by Wilhelm Geiger, assisted by Mabel H. Bode, (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 1950).

<sup>2</sup>Anton Muttukumaru, *The Military History of Ceylon-An Outline* (New Delhi, India: Navrang Publishers, 1987).

<sup>3</sup>E. F. C. Ludowyk, *The Modern History of Ceylon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966).

<sup>4</sup>Sir Charles Jeffries, *Ceylon: The Path to Independence* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963).

<sup>5</sup>James Jupp, *Sri Lanka-Third World Democracy* (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1978).

<sup>6</sup>Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, eds. *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

<sup>7</sup>Somasundaram Vanniasingham, *Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within* (New Delhi, India: Lancer International, 1989).

<sup>8</sup>A. Jayaratnam Wilson, *The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988).

<sup>9</sup>M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas* (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers, 1994).

<sup>10</sup>K. M. de Silva, *The Traditional Homelands of the Tamils, Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka-A Historical Appraisal* (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 1994).

<sup>11</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90* (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).

<sup>12</sup>W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, *Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi, India: Navrang Publishers, 1994).

<sup>13</sup>Jonathan Spencer, ed. *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

<sup>14</sup>William McGowan, *Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka* (New York: Farrar, Stratus and Giroux, 1992).

<sup>15</sup>David Little, *Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994).

<sup>16</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

### CHAPTER 3

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

This study used a historical research method. The research design was focused to answer the primary research question, "Does the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka validate Huntington's thesis as presented in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. This question is accompanied by several sub-problems as listed in chapter one. The research effort located sources providing information about Sri Lankan history and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Use of primary sources for the study was limited due to non-availability of such sources pertaining to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in the United States of America. After gathering relevant data from secondary sources, the information was examined and validated through cross checks with other secondary sources. The focus was on identifying differences between the two groups of people. Having done so, the study was expanded towards the fault lines with the aim of identifying the roots of the conflict.

The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth was the primary provider of sources. Some of the important sources that were not available in CARL were obtained through inter-library loans. The internet sources from the Sri Lanka Embassy in the United States and from the Sri Lankan newspapers were used to obtain the latest information. Although there are numerous web sites on the Internet containing relevant information, only data from the Sri Lankan Embassy in the USA sources were used for the research. This was done due to verification difficulties of the other internet sources.

The research initially established the relationship between the Sri Lankan problem and Huntington's thesis, then the relationship was extended to the causes of the ethnic conflict from a civilizational point of view. Huntington's criteria was used to evaluate civilizational differences. However, the study was based on the assumption that Buddhism is the core of the Sinhalese civilization in the island. The third sub-question identified in chapter one was addressed using the current proposals for devolution of power and the draft constitutional amendments submitted to the parliament in March 1997. The process of answering the three sub-questions paved the way to answer the research question.

## CHAPTER 4

### A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY

As in many nation-states where national identity is defined emphatically in the features of a majority ethnic identity, in Sri Lanka since independence, national identity has continued to be in conformity with dominant Sinhala-Buddhist identity.<sup>1</sup> Sri Lankan Tamils too identify themselves along similar lines: religion, language, culture, and social.<sup>2</sup> Although both ethnic groups have substantial percentages of Christians, they are identified along the lines of language, and the religion does not seem to have established a separate identity. Christians identify themselves as Sinhalese and Tamils based on the language they speak. The ethnic conflict had, in fact, "split the Catholic Church into two camps--one championing the Sinhalese nationalist claims and the other defending the Tamil opposition and its political aspirations."<sup>3</sup>

The Sinhala and Tamil communities in Sri Lanka today both tend to view their relationship in terms of long-standing histories.<sup>4</sup> These histories support the opposing territorial claims of the two communities and make conflict between them seem inevitable. However, nationalist identities in Sri Lanka have only recently begun to be considered in the wider historical context. Recent history shows that during the colonial period violent clashes did not erupt between groups defining themselves as Sinhala or Tamil, but between the groups defining themselves in terms of religious affiliation. The two religious affiliations were more often accompanied by the two languages: Sinhalese and Tamil.

However, the two different interpretations of history by the two groups have one thing in common. They agree that both the Sinhalese and the Tamils are immigrants from India. Similarly their religions, social structures, languages, agricultural economy, and political institutions are all of Indian origin.<sup>5</sup> Throughout history, they have always believed that Sri Lanka's salvation has come from India. For example, the *Buddha*, *Mahinda* (who is credited with having brought Buddhism to the island), *Buddhagosa* (the fifth-century A.D. *Pali* commentator who is known as a great contributor to Sinhalese literature), and everything suggested by the names of those three figures in religion and culture were Indian. Throughout this long period of history, the island of Sri Lanka was often united under a king who could subdue his various petty chieftains. More often than not, the island nation found itself drawn into the wars of the South Indian kingdoms, either in self-defense, or in alliance with one or the other of these warring princes. Sri Lanka's culture was based on Indian culture, yet it resisted Indianization.<sup>6</sup> This resistance to Indianization was mainly due to religious difference and suspicion they always harbored about Indian expansions and the desire to protect Buddhism.

The history testifies to many instances of Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils fighting together for a common cause, that is, to overthrow foreign invasions from South India, dominated by Dravidians who share language, religious and cultural ties with the Sri Lankan Tamils. But, those cultural affiliations had been subordinate to the struggle against Dravidian invasions from South India. This indicates that Sinhala and Tamil people in the past (prior to thirteenth century) had had a common identity when the interests of the land were threatened, despite the fundamental differences of language, religion, and culture. However, these invasions by Dravidians and several other demographical facts (such as close proximity to South India and inferiority in numbers) have resulted in a minority feeling among Sinhala speaking people in the

South Asian region.<sup>7</sup> The result was a fear of being overwhelmed by Tamils and the suspicion of ulterior motives of nationalist Tamil leaders. These feelings, reinforced by the perceived results of other foreign involvements in the island, helped nationalist leaders to rally support of the masses.

The ethnic harmony that prevailed in the island had undergone numerous tensions, especially during the nineteenth century. In order to survive under colonial rulers who created conditions to "divide and rule," both groups attempted to establish identities that would generate nationalist feelings to ensure national unity. Colonial administrations exploited racial and religious differences within the subject population. They ensured that legislatures had the practice of elected representation along ethnic divisions in a move to prevent the strengthening of nationalism and an anticolonial movement. This legislative environment had encouraged the two groups to grow apart.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, interpretation of history by the two groups was aimed at promoting self-interests. The feeling of being suppressed by the colonial rulers had assisted those who interpreted history to be as extremist as they wanted. Elizabeth Nissan and R. L. Stirrat have identified some anomalies of interpretations of the country's history as follows:

Despite the fact that these two histories are opposed versions of the past, each stressing the claims of the community which generates it, they share many features in common. Both present the past in terms of the interaction of two opposed entities, Sinhala and Tamil, who have always been separate as they are today. Second, they consist of arguments over events which allegedly occurred between the fourth century BC and the tenth century AD. Third, they present the two communities as historically and continuously opposed through warfare, joining an ancient past to the present with no regard for the hiatus of centuries. Fourth, the histories are both concerned with a "national people's" claim to its own territory. Finally, each side presents the other as little more than barbarians. Both sides in the present political context back up their respective claims through the selective use of histories and through the selective and competitive use of archaeological evidence. Factions on each side have been willing to destroy or reinterpret evidence which would support the other party. Differing maps are produced which purport to show the distribution of Sinhala and Tamils in Lanka during past centuries.<sup>9</sup>



These anomalies and actions taken by nationalist leaders to make the other side look inferior enhanced the fear and suspicion of each other. The two different interpretations of history strengthen the argument of the existence of two different subcivilizations in the island.

Because much of Sri Lankan history is written from a partisan Sinhala or Tamil point of view, it is often difficult to disentangle the historical evidence from the nationalist framework imposed upon it. But it does seem that prior to the nineteenth century the ideal regularity of race, language, religion, and political territory assumed in nationalist discourse was not clear cut. Nissan and Stirrat in their thesis identify some more anomalies in history as follows:<sup>10</sup>

1. The great historical centers of Sinhala Buddhist civilization are Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa....Yet there is inscriptional evidence of Tamil speaking groups living in such centers;...whilst architectural and sculptural evidence indicates strong linkage with South India and Tamil civilization....
2. In Jaffna, which today is the heartland of Sri Lanka Tamils, there are both place names which are undoubtedly Sinhala in origin, and Buddhist remains from the first millennium AD....
3. In the coastal zones of south western Sri Lanka today, the population is almost entirely Sinhala Buddhists...Yet what evidence there is indicates that these groups are the descendants of immigrants from Hindu South India:...Contact between the Sri Lankan littoral and South India seem to have been maintained until the nineteenth century....
4. The last independent kingdom in Sri Lanka was centered on Kandy in the interior of the island,...Kandy was ruled in its last years by a dynasty of Tamil speaking kings, the Nayakkars from Madurai in South India...One of these kings, Kirthi Sri Rajasinghe, is credited with the restoration of many Buddhist temples in the island and is often upheld as the great Buddhist revivalist of his age....

This above evidence paints a picture of a country with an intermixed population, irrespective of their origins. This model does not conform to the present day model of Sri Lanka, where people are extremely conscious of their identity. In the past there were dynastic wars; but those did not take the form of communal violence as seen after independence in 1948.<sup>11</sup> Most of the wars prior to the arrival of Europeans had been fought with Tamils, but with Tamils that represented a major civilization which resembled overwhelming power and authority that was ferocious. There had been a collective effort to throw them out of the island. Group identities

had not been a dominant factor then. History testifies that "Tamil speaking soldiers were crucial elements of the armies of the Sinhala kings, even acting as guards of the temple of the tooth in Polonnaruwa."<sup>12</sup> This indicates the prevalent ethnic harmony of that era, prior to the European invasions of the island. What happened to this ethnic harmony? When did they grow apart? These are some of the questions worth answering.

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* Huntington discusses the nature of civilizations under six central propositions concerning the nature, identity, and dynamics of civilizations.

First, a distinction exists between civilization in the singular and civilizations in the plural. The idea of civilizations was developed by eighteenth-century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of "barbarism." Civilized society differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban, and literate. To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad. The concept of civilization provided a standard by which to judge societies, and during the nineteenth century, Europeans devoted much intellectual, diplomatic and political energy to elaborating the criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently "civilized" to be accepted as members of the European-dominated international system. At the same time, however, people increasingly spoke of civilizations in the plural. This meant "renunciation of a civilization defined as an ideal, or rather as the ideal" and a shift away from the assumption there was a single standard for what was civilized, "confined," in Braudel's phrase, "to a few privileged peoples or groups, humanity's 'elite'." Instead there were many civilizations, each of which was civilized in its own way. Civilization in the singular, in short, "lost some of its cachet," and a civilization in the plural sense could in fact be quite uncivilized in the singular sense.<sup>13</sup>

Inhabitants of Sri Lanka in the nineteenth century were highly influenced by the Western-oriented education system introduced by their colonial masters. Westerners and Western-oriented locals who dominated in the society were seen as godly people with divine authority. They were considered "civilized" and superior while the others were considered less civilized, less important, or inferior in quality. Those interested in authority at various levels in society had to be seen and identified alongside these masters. Education was a key. But, it was accompanied by the religion: Christianity.

Tamils who inhabited coastal regions, a majority low caste Hindus, were receptive to the newly introduced religion, mainly due to caste problems that existed in Hinduism. Christian missionaries built schools in these areas. Sinhala Buddhists' attitude toward Christianity was hostile, owing to the extent to which Buddhism was deep rooted in Sinhalese culture. However, the Sinhalese elite who inhabited the colonial administrative centers embraced Christianity and had a better access to education. They enjoyed the benefits of being associates of the colonial masters. Sinhala Buddhists, inspired by the feelings of being left out, sought their identity. Tamil Hindu leadership, dominated by high caste Tamils too, joined the Buddhist leaders in the race to establish their own Tamil Hindu identity.

The nineteenth century was the time when European theorists were publishing their findings on the relationship between the German and the Indian people. Both of these claimed Aryan ancestry. This appealed to the Buddhist majority of the country, who were already convinced of their Aryan heritage based on the recordings in historical chronicles: *Mahawamsa* and *Chulawamsa*. The term *Arya* was closely associated with Buddhism. Among Buddhists, it had a greater appeal because of its religious associations. In Sinhala language the term *Chaturaryasatyaya* denotes "the four noble truths" of Buddhism, *Arya-astangika marga* denotes "the noble eight-fold path" of spiritual advancement, and *ariya puggala* were "individuals known for spiritual attainments."<sup>14</sup> This background encouraged the Sinhala elite to reinforce Sinhala identity with Buddhism, which showed a direct relationship with Aryans.

However, in the history chronicle *Chulavamsa*, the terms *Ariya* had been used to denote a group of people who were clearly distinguished from the Sinhala. The chronicle distinguishes *Ariya* mercenaries from the Sinhala soldiers. Most interestingly in the history chronicle, Gunawardena points out, no Sinhala king had been referred to as *Ariya*, and it was the dynasty

who ruled over the Tamil kingdom in Jaffna who called themselves *Arya Cakravarti*, meaning "Arya emperors." However, eminent Tamil scholar Professor S. J. Tambiah attributes the term *cakkavatti* to "Buddhist kings of Southeast Asia."<sup>15</sup>

The affiliation of the Sinhalese language with the Aryan race was widely welcomed in the nineteenth century Sinhalese society. During the period of colonial rule, the Sinhala consciousness underwent a radical transformation. The Sinhalese elite, groomed by the colonial rule in the nineteenth century, drew upon European thought as their own past traditions.<sup>16</sup> The period during which the Sinhala consciousness evolved witnessed the rise into prominence of racialist theories in Europe. Racial theories followed closely on the heels of theories of linguistic affinity, and the relationship between languages was explained as reflecting the common ancestry and common blood of the people who spoke those languages.<sup>17</sup>

In 1819 Friedrich Schlegel used the term *Aryan* to designate the group of people whose languages were structurally related. G. W. F. Hegel hailed the theory of affinity of the European languages with Sanskrit. According to him, this discovery revealed the relationship between the German and the Indian people. Many of the foremost scholars in oriental languages directed some of their research effort towards locating the beginning of the Aryan race and the identification of languages classifiable within the Aryan group.<sup>18</sup> However, in the later years of his career Millar, one of the scholars, wrote in his *Biography of Words*, *Aryan*, in scientific language, is utterly inapplicable to race. Gunawardena concludes these views of nineteenth-century scholars, stating that "the theory of the Aryan race was by this time too well established to be shaken by such a statement."<sup>19</sup>

There is a clearly conflicting view among scholars on the origins of the Sinhala language. Some theorists present the view that Sinhala language was derived from Sanskrit.

Others distinguish Sinhala from the Aryan languages of the North Indian people and list it with South Indian languages.<sup>20</sup> James de Alwis, as quoted by Gunawardena, argued that Sinhala shared a common origin with Sanskrit. It was not, however, a dialect of Sanskrit. Christian Lassen distinguished Sinhala from the Aryan languages of the North Indian people and listed it with the South Indian languages. James Emesson Tennent was more inclined to agree with Lassen and spoke of the affinity of Sinhala with the group of languages still in use in the Deccan: Tamil, Telingu, and Malayalam. He also said, that Sinhala has borrowed religious terms from Pali, and those pertaining to science and art from Sanskrit. In 1956 Caldwell identified Dravidian as a "family of languages," and this was the first time that the south Indian languages had been categorized in this manner. It was his opinion that there was "no direct affinity" between Sinhala and Tamil. According to W. F. Gunawardena, grammatical structure of Sinhala was Dravidian (Tamil), though its vocabulary was mainly Aryan.<sup>21</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, these linguistic groups were being given new definitions: terms of physical characteristics which were supposed to be specific to those groups. C. F. and P. B. Sarasin, as quoted by Gunawardena, identified three principal "well-distinguishable" races in Sri Lanka: the Sinhala, the Tamil, and the Veddas, and they believed that the Tamils were more closely related to the Veddas than the Sinhala.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, the racial theories received strong support from physical anthropology. Gunawardena quotes M. M. Kunte's lecture on Ceylon, delivered in 1879: "There are properly speaking, representatives of only two races in Ceylon--Aryans and Tamilians, the former being divided into descendants of Indian and Western Aryans." Kunte declared that he had discovered that "the formation of the forehead, the cheek bones, the chin, the mouth and the lips of Tamilians are distinctly different from those of the Ceylonese Aryans."<sup>23</sup> This affiliation of

physical characteristics with the race reinforced the Sinhalese sense of superiority. The fact that these relationships were established by a foreigner gave an added credibility to the idea among both Sinhalese and Tamils.

However, the end result of all these conflicting views was that the Sinhala and Tamil identities acquired a racial dimension. These scholarly contributions appear to have created dissension between the people speaking two languages. Influenced by nineteenth-century theories, early twentieth-century writings in Sinhala took a vehemently anti-Tamil stance. This pre-independence literature was the basis of the Sinhala ideology of the following period.

At the end of the nineteenth century, along with Aryan racial identity, another important element was incorporated into the Sinhala identity. That was Buddhism. With the resounding victory of Buddhist monk Migettuwatte (Mohottiwatte) Gunananda in an open debate against a Methodist leader David de Silva in 1873, the cultural tide turned decisively.<sup>24</sup> This Sinhala-Buddhist identity was reconstructed in opposition to the identity fostered by the missionaries and the colonial administration. The Sinhalese looked to their glorious past and to its achievements in the sphere of culture and civilizations to derive inspiration to build up a basis for their nationalist ideology. This was further enhanced by the desire to gain independence. Although the spread of Christianity was a threat to Hinduism, Hindus appear to have been more submissive than the Buddhists.

As a result, at the turn of the century there emerged two self-conscious groups of people: Sinhalese and Tamils. These identities were accompanied by their religions: Buddhism and Hinduism. Each viewed their past in the context of the future. Sinhalese had sufficient evidence, in their mind, to be identified in par with their colonial masters: Europeans. As identified in Huntington's first classification of the nature of civilizations, Sinhalese had some of

the "criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently 'civilized' to be accepted as members of the European dominated international system."<sup>25</sup> Tamil intellectuals realized the danger and began retaliation. The race to establish identity began. They became more self-conscious and suspicious of their Sinhala counterparts. The ground was ready for the seeds of conflict.

Huntington's second proposition on the nature of civilizations is as follows:

Second, a civilization is a cultural entity, outside Germany. Nineteenth century German thinkers drew a sharp distinction between civilization, which involved mechanics, technology, and material factors, and culture, which involved values, ideals, and the higher intellectual artistic, moral qualities of a society. This distinction has persisted in German thought but has not been accepted elsewhere. Some anthropologists have even reversed the relation and conceived of cultures as characteristics of primitive, unchanging, non-urban societies, while more complex, developed, urban, and dynamic societies are civilizations. These efforts to distinguish culture and civilization, however, have not caught on, and, outside Germany, there is overwhelming agreement with Braudel that it is "delusory to wish in the German way to separate *culture* from its foundation *civilization*."

Civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of people, and a civilization is a culture writ large. They both involve the "values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance." A civilization is, for Braudel, "a space, a 'cultural area'," "a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena." Wallerstein defines it as "a particular concatenation of world view, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and high culture) which forms some kind of historical whole and which co-exists (if not always simultaneously) with other varieties of this phenomenon." A civilization is, according to Dawson, "the product of a particular people," while for Durkheim and Mauss, it is "a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole." To Spengler a civilization is "the inevitable *destiny* of the Culture" the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable...a conclusion, the thing become succeeding the thing becoming." Culture is the common theme in virtually every definition of civilization.

The key cultural elements which define a civilization were set forth in classic form by the Athenians when they reassured the Spartans that they would not betray them to the Persians:

For there are many and powerful considerations that forbid us to do so, even if we were inclined. First and chief, the images and dwellings of the gods, burnt and laid ruins: this we must need avenge to the utmost of our power, rather than make terms with the man who has perpetrated such deeds. Secondly, the Grecian race being of the same blood and the same language, and the temples of the gods and sacrifices in common; and our similar customs; for the Athenians to become betrayers of these would not be well. Blood, language, religion, way of life, were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non-Greeks. Of all the objective elements

which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and the people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia and the Subcontinent.

A significant correspondence exists between the division of people by cultural characteristics into civilizations and their division by physical characteristics into races. Yet civilization and race are not identical. People of the same race can be deeply divided by civilization; people of different races may be united by civilization. In particular, the great missionary religions, Christianity and Islam, encompass societies from a variety of races. The crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes and skin colors.<sup>26</sup>

Sinhala and Tamil cultures have existed on the island over a long period. Often these two have interacted positively. According to Huntington, religion is the most important objective element which defines civilizations.<sup>27</sup> The classification stands valid in Sri Lanka. The two ethnic groups have their identities well bound within separate religions: Buddhism and Hinduism. Both religions have their roots in India and have numerous features in common. The Christian church,<sup>28</sup> that represent 8 percent of country's population, has split into two camps-- "one championing the Sinhalese nationalist claims and the other defending the Tamil opposition and its political aspirations."<sup>29</sup>

Although the major identity components of the Sinhalese and Tamils are languages and religion, both of these groups share many parallel features, such as traditional caste, kinship, popular religious cults, customs, etc.<sup>30</sup> The Buddhist practices stand out as one good example of "civilization mix." Buddhism and Hinduism play a combined role in the average Buddhist society. There are places of worship designated for Hindu gods in almost all Buddhist temples all over the island. Another cult is the worship of the God Kataragama (of Hindu Origin) who, it appears, has emerged as the pre-eminent guardian god of the Sinhalese.<sup>31</sup> Religious practices of Buddhism and Hinduism have many similarities. Hindu gods are almost equally treated and



worshipped in Buddhist temples. These are not all but a few examples of the interwoven religious practices in spite of doctrine.

Although they do not appear to have much in common doctrinally, in practice within the country, there are many common features. One good example is the caste system embedded in society. The Sinhala caste system closely resembles the caste system practiced by Hindus. However, Buddhism, while emphasizing the norm of respecting elders, does not ascribe high or low status on people. "Buddhism differentiates people into high and low on the basis of their righteousness and not according to their external differences, such as those based on caste, ethnicity and like."<sup>32</sup> Even after escalation of violence in the country, Buddhists and Hindus continue their rituals at Katharagama, in a shrine of an originally Hindu god who now appears to be a guardian god for many Buddhists. It is co-located with one of the most respected Buddhist temples in the southern province. Although religion has played an important role in establishing the identities of both Sinhala and Tamil people, the religious harmony of the majority of the two groups has not served to ease tension.

According to Professor Wiswa Warnapala, "the ancient achievement of the Sinhalese--including the fusion of the state with the Buddhist church [sic]--were recorded in the ancient chronicle's which identified the fortunes of Buddhism with the fortunes of the Sinhala nation."<sup>33</sup> Like the Sinhalese majority, the Tamil minority too, based their identity on a variety of historical facts. They identify themselves broadly as Tamil-Hindus.<sup>34</sup> This demonstrates the extent to which both communities share and believe in all aspects of the traditional past. These nationalistic feelings and aspirations of both groups remained suppressed due to the power of the colonial rule. With independence in 1948, these feelings too were unleashed.

The Sinhalese attitude toward restoring the dignity lost under the European regime invariably was based on language and religion. The divisions on language of the two groups, however, were not deep rooted. The 1915 Buddhist-Muslim conflict proves this fact. When the majority Sinhala speaking Buddhists and Sinhala and Tamil speaking Muslims clashed, the Tamil leadership took the side of the Sinhalese.<sup>35</sup> This clearly indicates that the language issue, although having its roots in nineteenth century, was not a major factor in politics at the turn of the twentieth century. This affiliation could also be seen as the extent of the relationships between the three religions. Tamil Hindu leadership decided to support Sinhala Buddhists who had closer religious ties than did the Muslims, thus justifying the action taken by them among the Tamil population. Similarly, Tamil speaking Muslims do not recognize Tamils who follow Hinduism and Christianity as an ally. Instead Muslims would never agree to let Tamils act as the sole representative for the Tamil speaking people in the country. This feeling of the Muslims was demonstrated in 1986 when peace negotiations were on the way with Indian mediation, when Muslims insisted on a separate delegation to represent Muslims of the island.

Internationally, within the South Asian region, religion appears to have had a major impact on the conflict in the country. India, which harbors the world's largest Hindu population, went out of its way to covertly help her "kin" Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka when Sinhalese harassed Tamils in the 1983 riots by training militants and providing a safe haven in South India. Tamil-Hindus in South India continued to support the motives of the Sri Lankan Tamils in their war effort against the Buddhist dominant Sri Lankan government. In one instance, when Sri Lankan forces launched a major offensive against Tamil terrorists in 1987, India went up to the extent of violating the air-space of Sri Lanka. The fact that Sri Lanka was a member of the United Nations, Non-aligned Movement, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and

most importantly that Sri Lanka's foreign policy held India as her closest ally, were subordinate to India's desire to prevent the Sri Lanka Army from conducting offensive operations against Tamil guerrillas.

This was mainly due to the commonalties in language and religion. The problem now appears to be based on language rather than anything else. Thus Huntington's view on the relationship of blood and civilization was evident in recent developments of the ethnic violence in many different forms. Most significant were the events which took place in 1983, which many scholars identify as the trigger event of the separatist struggle of the Tamils. The massacre of thirteen soldiers by a land mine activated by the LTTE "jolted the Sinhalese psyche like nothing else had done before."<sup>36</sup> The Sinhalese considered this as an act directed against the entire Sinhala nation. It erupted into a riot that spread like wild fire across the entire nation. Sinhalese were now killing Tamils who had shared the same neighborhood. Long-standing neighborly relations were marred by the feelings of revenge for the Sinhala blood triggered by the massacre of soldiers. Until July 1983, most victims of Tamil militants had been Tamils-- civilians, politicians, officials, and policemen. The Sinhala killed in Jaffna were a handful of policemen. That too was not by design. The riots changed all that. Tamil rebels in the north and east started directing their violence toward the Sinhalese by design.

The 1983 anti-Tamil violence generated angry reactions in Tamil Nadu, which is dominated by Hindu, Tamil speaking people.<sup>37</sup> Tamils in Tamil Nadu began applying political pressure on the Indian central government to get directly involved in the Sri Lankan internal matters. It also generated a feeling of patriotism among Tamils and encouraged joining the armed factions. This feeling helped boost the numbers of Tamils in arms.

As the third proposition Huntington identifies civilization as a comprehensive cultural entity. He described it as follows:

Third, civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Civilizations, Toynbee argued, "comprehend without being comprehended by others." A civilization is a "totality." Civilizations, Melko goes on to say,

have a certain degree of integration. Their parts are defined by their relationship to each other and to the whole. If the civilization is composed of states, these states will have more relations to one another than they do to states outside the civilization. They might fight more, and engage more frequently in diplomatic relations. They will be more interdependent economically. There will be pervading aesthetic and philosophical currents.

A civilization is the broadest cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture in a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Chinese or Hindu communities. Chinese, Hindus, and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he strongly identifies. Civilizations are the biggest "we" within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other "them" out there. Civilizations may involve a large number of people, such as Chinese civilization, or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. Throughout history, many small groups of people have existed possessing a distinct culture and lacking any broader cultural identification. Distinctions have been made in terms of size and importance between major and peripheral civilizations (Bagby) or major and arrested or abortive civilizations (Toynbee). This book is concerned with what are generally considered the major civilizations in human history.

Civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time. The cultures of people interact and overlap. The extent to which the cultures of civilizations resemble or differ from each other also varies considerably. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.<sup>38</sup>

Indo-Aryans (Sinhalese) and Dravidians (Tamils) both claim their roots in India. They belonged to a major Indian civilization that encompassed the subcontinent. Although India is

undeniably their parent in many ways, all indigenous Sri Lankans--Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims--become visibly annoyed, if not outraged, if Sri Lanka is mistaken to be part of India or if it is thought culturally a part of "greater India."<sup>39</sup> Under such circumstances, Tamils do not contradict their identity as Sri Lankans. All ethnic groups living in the island are proud of their heritage, their civilization, which they perceive as superior to that of India. This tendency can be attributed to their pride of British coating: Sri Lanka progressed more quickly than their Indian counterparts. The island enjoyed a comparative prosperity owing to its plantation economy, and the school system and transportation were more efficient than any could possibly be in the vast subcontinent of India. A sense of credibility to these feelings was added by the nineteenth-century European criteria of judging non-Western societies. However, the Tamil and Sinhalese civilizations in the island have much in common, proving the fact that these are constituent units of the major *Indic* civilization.

Within the island, however, Sinhalese and Tamil identities established during the nineteenth century are widely accepted. Sri Lankan Tamils, who would prefer to identify as *Sri lankan* in the world, have been successful in establishing a common identity with Tamils all over the world. Tamils from various parts of the world help the Sri Lankan Tamils in their cause. Specifically, Indian Tamils in South India showed their wholehearted support several times. The killing of charismatic Indian leader Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE did not change the attitudes of South Indian Tamils greatly, although it had a greater impact elsewhere in India. Sinhalese, although they are North Indian in origin, were not able to muster a support equal to that of the Tamils. According to Edgar O'Ballance, Indian prime minister, Mrs. Gandhi, in the early 1980s, "decided to destabilize the Ceylonese government, and to give covert support to the Tamil insurgents. She wanted them to work for a federal solution for the Tamil-speaking provinces, in

the hope they might one day federate with India's Tamil Nadu state." He attributes this decision to the Sri Lankan government's attitude of establishing closer contacts with the United States, west European countries, China and Pakistan. "Mrs. Gandhi suspected that the United States had its eye on the port and harbor of Trincomalee for a base that would establish an American presence in the Indian Ocean, and Britain, the former colonial power, of trying to reassert its former authority in some other form."<sup>40</sup>

Another statement made by Gandhi in the Indian parliament testifies to the Indian government's support to the Hindu Tamil rebels. She told the parliament that India was "certainly bothered about the atrocities and human right violations" in Sri Lanka, but added that the situation in the island could not be compared with either Punjab or pre-1971 Bangladesh.<sup>41</sup> Although she did not clarify it, quite clearly the difference between the Sri Lankan conflict and the conflicts in Punjab and pre-1971 Bangladesh was the religion. This action by the Indian government indicates that, from their point of view, Tamils who share the same faith (Hinduism) were more important to them than the Aryan (Indian in origin) relationship of the Sinhalese, which was often referred to in Indo-Lanka matters. The sovereignty of Sri Lanka as a nation-state too was seriously violated in 1987, when the Indian Air Force violated Sri Lankan air-space in favor of her (India's) "kin" the Sri Lankan Tamil-Hindus.

Huntington's fourth proposition is:

Fourth, civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations, "realities of the extreme *longue duree*." Their "unique and particular essence" is "their long historical continuity. Civilization is in fact the longest story of all." Empires rise and fall, governments come and go, civilizations remain and "survive political, social, economic, even ideological upheavals." "International history," Bozeman concludes, "rightly documents the thesis that political systems are transient expedients on the surface of the civilization, and that the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which successive generations have coalesced and which thus symbolize the society's continuity." Virtually all the major civilizations in the world in the

twentieth century either have existed for a millennium or, as with Latin America, are the immediate offspring of another long-lived civilization.

While civilizations endure, they also evolve. They are dynamic; they rise and fall; they merge and divide; and as any student of history knows, they also disappear and are buried in the sands of time. The phases of their evolution may be specified in various ways. Quigley sees civilizations moving through seven stages: mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion. Melko generalizes a model of change from a crystallized feudal system to a feudal system in transition to a crystallized state system to a state system in transition to a crystallized imperial system. Toynbee sees a civilization arising as a response to challenges and then going through a period of growth involving increasing control over its environment produced by a creative minority, followed by a time of troubles, the rise of a universal state, and then disintegration. While significant differences exist, all these theories see civilizations evolving through a time of troubles or conflict to a universal state to decay and disintegration.<sup>42</sup>

The clash between the two groups who have many characteristics in common falls very well within Huntington's criteria. Sinhala and Tamil nationalistic movements define themselves both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, and institutions and the subjective self-identification of people.<sup>43</sup>

A firm boundary between Sinhala and Tamil people does not seem to have existed. Over the history it has been a matter of perception. Sir Charles Jeffrey in his historical account said:

As the power of the Sinhalese kings declined, new colonists became established in the northern and eastern regions of the island. These were Hindus from south India. They did not merge with the Aryan Sinhalese, but kept their own religion, language and culture. Their descendants, known as 'Ceylon Tamils,' along with....<sup>44</sup>

Another historian, K. M. de Silva, wrote in his account of Sri Lankan history that "neither the Sinhala nor the Tamils remained racially pure."<sup>45</sup> These two views indicate the differences of opinion among scholars of the island's history. This difference invariably encouraged nationalists to form different versions of interaction between the two groups in order to promote their causes.

Postindependence Sri Lanka witnessed dramatic changes in the social and political arenas. Two groups continued to further their division. Both Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese

effectively took part in the competition to fill the vacuum when the British started leaving the island. This division was reinforced by group cohesiveness. Despite long standing interpenetration of these people, in 1949, a year after independence, there were only 167 marriages between Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese in the entire country.<sup>46</sup>

The year 1956 was critical. Nationalistic feelings dominated the political arena. The Sinhalese movement had turned against the Tamils. "By the time of the 1956 election, the proponents of Sinhala as the official language aimed to exclude the Tamil language from official recognition, at least as much as they aimed to displace English."<sup>47</sup> The religious side of the movement advanced in parallel. It was initially directed at the favored place of the Christians and Christian institutions. However, the end result widened the gulf between the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus. The major Sinhalese parties saw that there was no going back on Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. This trend contributed to nationalistic politics in the island that would be catastrophic. In 1956, Sinhala became the official language, and Buddhism gradually became, de facto, something of an official religion.

The Sinhalese nationalists demands in 1956 were not unfounded. There really was a deprivation in government employment for Sinhalese. By the time of independence in 1948, the Sinhalese remained underrepresented in government employment. In professional and technical fields, Sinhalese under-representation continued well into the post-1956 period. A good example can be found in appointments to the government Accounts' Service (from 1948-1960) and the government Audit Service (from 1948-1960). In both cases Tamils outnumbered Sinhalese by about two to one. The Sinhala-Buddhist majority saw these figures with enmity and wholeheartedly supported the political moves that promised reinforcement of Sinhala Buddhist



domination in the country. After 1960 the figures of government employment were dominated by the Sinhalese. (See appendix C, Tables 3-9.)

When the changes emerged, the once favored Tamils (by the British administration) were now feeling the indigestible change in status, dignity, and employment and began to react angrily to what they considered to be Sinhalese oppression. This created a favorable environment for Tamil leaders, such as G. Ponnambalam and S. J. V. Chelvanayagam, who were determined to further Tamil interests. The Tamil Congress, which campaigned for an equal number of Sinhalese and Tamil seats in the state council in 1944, gained strength. So-called Sinhalese repression prompted the formation of the Tamil Federal party in 1949.<sup>48</sup> This became the party that dominated the political cause for a separate state for Tamils.

As late as 1974 Tamils did not object collectively to Sinhala being taught in their schools, as it was key to government employment. Also low caste Tamils, "shackled by inequality within their community" were attracted to Buddhism and Christianity,<sup>49</sup> both of which did not tolerate caste discrimination. In 1972 four Tamil political parties, including the Federal Party, formed themselves into the Tamil United Front (TUF) to campaign for parity of status for the Tamil language. In 1973 they ratified a decision to work for an independent Tamil state. The formation of TUF led to the formation of the Tamil Youth League (TYL) by some forty Tamil youth, many of whom subsequently were in the forefront of the militant movements.<sup>50</sup> The unsuccessful revolutionary attempt by the Sinhalese Marxist rebel group *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna* (JVP) in 1971, provided good insight to the Tamil radicals into the mechanism of warfare and state power.<sup>51</sup> It demonstrated that a relatively weak state could be fought and overcome. By the middle of the 1970s, there were several Tamil resistance groups poised to

fight for a separate state. By the early 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) emerged dominant.

The leader of this group, Velupillai Prabhakaran, a school drop out at the age of sixteen, hails from a small fishing town in the North. He was selective in recruitment. He drew most of his militants from low caste Tamils.<sup>52</sup> This selective recruitment helped him in setting the ground for a long, protracted struggle. His Tamil Tigers selectively assassinated several Tamil leaders, several Tamils serving in the security forces, and others who stood against him. Prabhakaran claims to be a dedicated Marxist. However, he is weak in theory. The young Oxford graduate Anton Balasingham filled this vacuum.<sup>53</sup> By the late 1980s, LTTE had eliminated all the other Tamil groups that claimed to be representing the Tamil cause and emerged as the dominant representative of the Tamils in the absence of other leaders who fled South seeking refuge.

### Summary

Civilizations have no clear cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities, and, as a result, the composition and shape of the civilizations change over time.<sup>54</sup> Sri Lanka represents this part of Huntington's argument. Sinhala and Tamil people had interacted intensively before European colonizers arrived on the island. Except for a brief period between the thirteenth century and the sixteenth century, there had been no significant power struggle within Sri Lanka. Religion, which is considered as the key element in civilizational identity, had interacted more than anything else. This is clearly evident in the Sinhala social structure and religious practices. Although Buddhism rejected the caste system in society, the Sinhala Buddhist society had a strong hierarchically organized caste system similar to that practiced by the Tamil Hindus. This had a decisive impact, even after

independence, in politics and the government's hierarchy. Hindu gods have a dominant place, even today, in Buddhist temples.

Civilization in Sri Lanka appears to be a long independent subcivilization of *Indic* civilization. Buddhism has provided the core of the majority Sinhala civilization. The language, although it has its roots in the classical Indian language Sanskrit, is distinctly Sri Lankan and does not resemble any other language in the world. However, the relationship of the Sinhala language with Sanskrit and other North Indian languages has established the relationship between the Aryan race and the Sinhalese. Theoretical establishment of this link has given credibility to ancient history chronicles that date several centuries back. The continuity of these history chronicles has been an unbroken tradition, mainly due to Buddhist priests. Therefore many scholars tend to argue that it is a pro-Buddhist document. However, the general population does not question the authority of these chronicles.

As previously stated, prior to Western influence, the Sinhalese and Tamils had lived in relative harmony. The main focus then had been to thwart foreign invasions. During the colonial era, each group had gone through an identity crisis which had resulted in establishment of Sinhalese and Tamil national identities. Extremist nationalist leaders had used these identities to gain popular support. The result was animosity directed toward each other. Seeds of the conflict started growing rapidly after independence.

The different identities established by each group and actions taken by postindependence governments had fueled the crisis. India's identification of the Tamils as an entity of the Hindu civilization, although it was not worded that way, encouraged Indian government assistance to Tamils, at the risk of violating the sovereignty of her neighbor. The Sinhala fear of being overwhelmed by a Tamil Hindu majority in the region prevented the Sinhala government from

devolution of power to the North and East regions. This could be attributed to the Sinhalese fear of elimination of their much-treasured Buddhist civilization, which was thrown out of India over a period of time by Hindu revivalism.

The idea of civilization in the singular introduced by Western thinkers generated in Sri Lankan society a competition between Sinhalese and Tamils to establish identities. These identities helped each group to look better than the other in the eyes of colonial masters. Although the clash between these identities initially appeared to be a vehicle to reach higher echelons of society, later it evolved into enmity. This enmity became open with independence. The cultural similarities that exist between the two groups prove the long standing merger of two different civilizations. However, the two groups drifted apart with the establishment of identities. This situation in the island supports Huntington's central propositions concerning the nature, identity and dynamics of civilizations.

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<sup>1</sup>Serena Tennakoon, "Newspaper Nationalism: Sinhala Identity as Historical Discourse," in *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict*, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York: Routledge, 1990), 205.

<sup>2</sup>Dagmar Helmann Rajanayagam, "Tamils and the Meaning of History," in *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity*, ed. Chelvanayagam Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 54

<sup>3</sup>Tambiah S. J. *Buddhism Betrayed?, Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 86.

<sup>4</sup>Elizabeth Nissan and R. L. Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities," in *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict*, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York: Routledge, 1990), 19.

<sup>5</sup>E. F. C. Ludowyk, *The Modern History of Ceylon* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger publishers, 1966), 7.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>K. M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict, Management and Resolution*, (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 1996), 1.

<sup>8</sup>Jayantha Danapala, in an address to the Asia Society Washington Center (Internet: <http://wheat.symgrp.com/symgrip/srilanka/embassy>, 1996), 9.

<sup>9</sup>Elizabeth Nissan, 21.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.* Nissan and Stirrat attribute this fact to G. W. Spencer, "The politics of plunder: the Cholas in eleventh century Ceylon," JAS, 1976, vol. 2, 410-416.

<sup>13</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 40.

<sup>14</sup>R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, "The People of the Lion: the Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography," in *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict*, ed. Jonathan Spencer (New York: Routledge, 1990), 73.

<sup>15</sup>S. J. Tambiah, *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1992), 2.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>David Little, *Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 18.

<sup>25</sup>Huntington, 41.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 41-42.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>28</sup>The term *Christianity* is used to identify all denominations of Christianity. Tambiah in his book, *Buddhism Betrayed?* used the term "Catholic church"

<sup>29</sup>Tambiah, 86.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 59.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 117.

<sup>33</sup>Wiswa Warnapala, *Ethnic Strife and Politics of Sri Lanka* (New Delhi, India: Navrang, 1994), 23.

<sup>34</sup>Tambiah, 5.

<sup>35</sup>Bryan Pfaffanberger, "Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils," in *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and identity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 14.

<sup>36</sup>M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka; From Boys to Guerrillas* (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers, 1994), 93.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 95.

<sup>38</sup>Huntington, 42-43.

<sup>39</sup>S. J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 2.

<sup>40</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, *The Cyanide War; Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88* (London, UK: Brassey's, 1989), 15.

<sup>41</sup>M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka; From Boys to Guerrillas* (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers, 1994), 131.

<sup>42</sup>Huntington, 43-44.

<sup>43</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, 43.

<sup>44</sup>Sir Charles Jeffries, *Ceylon: The Path to Independence* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 2.

<sup>45</sup>Elizabeth Nissan, 22

<sup>46</sup>Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1980), 32

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>48</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, *The Cyanide War* (London, UK: Brassey's, 1989), 4.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>50</sup>M. R. Narayan Swamy, 26.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>52</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, 13.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>54</sup>Huntington, 43.

## CHAPTER 5

### A SOLUTION: THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* Huntington argues that “fault line conflicts are interminable.” His proposition is that a conflict may evaporate over the course of centuries through evolution of its roots, such as “geographical proximity, different religions and cultures, separate social structures, and historical memories of the two societies.”<sup>1</sup> Laying a strong foundation for this evolution is key for the successful resolution of “fault line conflict.” The recent political developments in Sri Lanka indicate that the majority of the Sri Lankan leaders seem to have arrived at an analysis similar to Huntington’s: that the roots of the conflict are “civilizational” and must be addressed as such.

The current political crisis in Sri Lanka revolves around the controversies over devolution of power. The British political legacy of centralization has been subjected to a series of changes since the early 1980s. The apparent hesitance in introducing a new level of government between the national government and local government bodies is diminishing. However, regionalism is now recognized as having advantages in generating political participation in decision making at local levels, that is, provincial or district levels. The general public is getting more and more interested in local political participation.

The current debate with regard to devolution of power in Sri Lanka illustrates two vital themes. The first is the dilemmas that confront a political establishment of a recently independent nation in conceding legitimacy to regional loyalties. The political establishment in



these nations, as legatees of departing imperial powers, passionately protects this inheritance in the shape of the state granted to them at the transfer of power and regards centralized authority as an essential political and administrative instrument at their disposal. They often justify this by arguing that centralization is essential for the introduction and management of the processes of social change designed to eliminate poverty. In that situation anything likely to encourage if not lead to communal or ethnic fragmentation is regarded with utmost suspicion.<sup>2</sup> This suspicion is further enhanced by the close proximity of the so-called "traditional homelands" of the Tamils to the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where the separatist sentiments were nurtured at the inception. India, based on Huntington's concept of "kin country," has a dominant role to play in order to make possible any devolution attempts in Sri Lanka. The majority of Sinhalese base their judgment on the attitudes of India as the kin country of the Tamils.

The current devolution proposals have addressed issues with regard to the identities of the people which were hitherto considered as intractable. However, some of the key issues of ethnic identity that have divided the two groups of people have already been addressed, and some of them are sorted out. For instance, religious tensions between Buddhists and Christians, which was one of the most divisive factors in Sri Lankan public life beginning in the nineteenth century, has ceased to be a serious issue.<sup>3</sup> These religious tensions at times had been so sharp that they gave every impression of remaining an abiding factor in the division of Sri Lankan public life. Many of these tensions have been linked to controversies over state-controlled education.

By the end of 1960s, another settlement was reached on the status of the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The problems of the political status and voting rights of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka came to the political arena as long ago as 1928-31. Sri Lanka was the first colonial society

outside the white dominions to enjoy the benefits of universal suffrage. This was introduced in 1931, seventeen years before the country became independent. Except for a small, left-wing minority, the majority of the Sri Lankan politicians refused to accept the position that all Indians resident in the country were entitled to citizenship. The controversy over this issue, which began in 1928, continued for two decades. Throughout the transfer-of-power negotiations with the colonial administration, Sri Lankan politicians insisted upon and succeeded in obtaining the position that the independent government of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) had the right to determine who its citizens were.<sup>4</sup> The Sri Lankan experience was unique for another reason. India generally refused to accept repatriation of people of Indian origin from former colonial territories back to India. Only in the case of Indians in Sri Lanka was this accepted. These agreements reached to accommodate Indian Tamils from Sri Lanka constitute a major political accomplishment, considering the feelings this question has aroused since 1928.<sup>5</sup>

The success in language policy is even more significant. Looking back on these controversies and their consequences, one feels that the price the country paid in the breakdown of the ethnic harmony through ignition of the civilizational tension outweighed the undeniable benefits the emphasis on the indigenous language brought to the people. Had the Sinhalese political leadership not taken such a speedy course of action to give primacy to the indigenous language, had they been more patient and followed the path of eventual change, the Tamil leadership may not have had an escape goat to exploit the civilizational identities. The long merger of the two civilizations was made to appear more distant than it actually was through the adoption of the language policies soon after independence.

More importantly, the "Sinhala only" language policy has proved to be an elusive objective which has had the effect of provoking a similar passionate commitment to the defense

of their language as much as provoking an expression of their ethnic identity--thus civilizational identity--by the Tamils. The reversion of the parity status to the two languages occurred in 1987 as part of the Peace Accord brokered by the Indian government. But the advantages anticipated were not gained, because the main representatives of the Tamil political opinion in the country never officially acknowledged that the reality of language policy had deviated from its discourse over the years.

"Sinhala only" was a convenient excuse exploited for political purposes by local sections of the Sinhalese political elite. The clauses on language in the Constitution of 1978 reflected a recognition of an existing reality. Indeed, with this constitutional change, the language rights that the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka enjoyed were on a par with those of the French in Canada or those of the non-German minorities in the cantons of Switzerland, and immeasurably superior to those of the Tamils of Malaysia.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, in regard to education, their position is superior to that of many minorities in other parts of the world. The Tamils have enjoyed the right to education through the medium of the Tamil language at all levels, in all parts of the country. Although differences of opinion over devolution of power between the Sri Lankan government and the representatives of the Tamil opinion have altogether proved to be more difficult to resolve, a great deal has been achieved.

Sri Lankan leaders have the major task of keeping the country together and managing its ethnic conflict. Considering the recent past and conflicting perceptions of vulnerability, this task will be extremely difficult. Establishing a sense of tolerance in each ethnic group will be essential. This has been made more complicated by the nationalism promoted by some prominent Sinhalese and Tamil leaders as a mean of attaining independence. However, since independence, Sri Lanka has been engulfed with suffering. All Sri Lankans, irrespective of

differences of race, religion, or social status, have suffered for the past several years the adverse effects of the ethnic conflict. It has adversely affected every element of public life, seriously disrupting every progressive move the nation has attempted to make.

The most recent addition to the adverse perceptions is the young generations of the two communities that have grown apart. There is a generation of Tamils, the majority of which is in the age groups below twenty years, who have grown with a feeling of hate and discontent. Some of them have lost their educational opportunities due to ongoing conflict. Most of them have been fed with disinformation. For instance, there are some Tamil children who believe the terrorists' version of interpreting Sri Lankan security forces as a force in occupation of their motherland. Similarly some sections of the young Sinhalese generation, who have been subjected to the terror of the terrorists, have a general hatred of the Tamils.

Since independence there have been numerous attempts to find a feasible solution to the ethnic problem, including the Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957; the agreement concluded between Dudley Senanayake and S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in 1965; the Indo-Lanka accord, and the subsequent thirteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1987; the Democratic Peoples' Alliance Proposals of 1988; the Interim report of the Mangala Moonasinghe Parliamentary Select Committee in 1992; and the Gamini Dissanayake proposals contained in the United National Party manifesto for the presidential elections of 1994.<sup>7</sup> These were some of the prominent proposals presented prior to the present administration of President Chandrika Kumaranatunga. All these proposals were based on the concept of devolution of power at varying degrees. However, all these attempts have proved unsuccessful due to many different reasons. There are two principal reasons that have contributed to their failure, namely, the inherent weakness of the proposals themselves and the resolve of the political leadership being

undermined in the face of opposition from various forces holding extreme points of view. The result of this continuous failure has been a legacy of war and strife.

The current administration has put forward a proposal to end the ethnic strife and in March 1997 forwarded a draft constitution based on those proposals. These proposals are not completely alien. They represent continuity with the previously proposed solutions. According to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, "They have drawn inspiration from the more practical suggestions that have emerged over the past forty years, and the distinguishing feature of the Government's proposals is that they are coherent and logical conclusion of a historical process of similar attempts which, upon implementation, would enable a substantial degree of devolution of power within the framework of a united Sri Lanka."<sup>8</sup>

The proposed political solution referred to has as its objective the widespread distribution of power among the people and has been based on the following principals:

1. Promoting a vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety and security and their human dignity is valued and equality of treatment is an accepted norm of public life.<sup>9</sup>

2. Ensuring that all communities be given the space to express their distinct identity and promote that identity, including the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and nurture and promote their own language, including the right to transact business with the State in the national language of their choice.<sup>10</sup>

3. Ensuring that all persons may fully and effectively exercise all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any distinction and full equality before the law.<sup>11</sup>

4. Giving recognition to Sinhala and Tamil as official languages and recognizing English as a link language.<sup>12</sup>

5. Providing an effective constitutional framework for the sharing of power between central government and regions, based on an "internally consistent and coherent value system."<sup>13</sup>

There would be clarity and consistency in the distribution of power between the center and the regions, and the scheme would be one which is capable of effective implementation and includes structures for the just and equitable resolution of center region disputes.<sup>14</sup>

6. Ensuring that all communities participate fully in the life of the nation, whether it be at the national, regional, or local level, "thereby encouraging the regions and the communities which inhabit them to become constructive partners in a stable and pluralistic democracy."<sup>15</sup>

The new constitutional amendments address the key issues of perceived relative deprivation of the minorities in the island. Hence, it is expected to avert the deprived feelings (and adverse perceptions) of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. These proposals have drawn the attention of both groups. This is significant because it has generated a new enthusiasm among the public. The public debate through media has shed light on both positive and negative aspects of the proposals. Most importantly, the hope it generated has resulted in active participation among all sections of society demanding responses from both groups.

The starting point of this analysis is the historical memories of the people. The Sinhalese have a sense of the historical destiny of a small and embattled people who have preserved Theravada Buddhism when it was smashed in India under a Hindu revivalism. They have a deep affiliation to the Sinhala language which is uniquely independent from its Indian roots. They also have a strong perception of Tamils as a traditional enemy against whom they have fought at various times over a long period in common history. Although most of the fighting prior to Western dominance in the region occurred between the Sri Lankans and Indians (as against Tamils and Sinhalese), the recent developments have generated a sense of historical

animosity between the two groups. Above all they (Sinhalese) have a perception of southern India as the source from which a number of invasions were launched in the ancient time, because the history connects the origin of almost all invasions to South India. These reasons have contributed to a feeling, among the Sinhalese, of being overwhelmed by Tamils in the region.

Another equally important fact is the historical memory of a long, successful record, over many centuries, of retaining national independence against Western invaders. That prolonged resistance was entirely one of the Sinhalese fighting the invaders. There is no record of Tamils' resistance to Western rule. This has generated, in Sinhalese, a sense of pride and enhanced "group cohesion and commitment."<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the Sinhalese more often tend to view the Sinhalese nationalism as the driving force of the existence of the nation. The Tamils do not have much historical proof of their claims. There is very little evidence of definitions of the boundaries they claim to be "national areas" of the Tamils except for occasional references to the northern and the eastern provinces as demarcated by the British in the nineteenth century. Their claims are based on a widely challenged document prepared by Hugh Cleghorn, a colonial secretary, dated 1 June 1799.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps these weaknesses of the Tamil claims have assisted the Sinhalese in justifying their dominance.

The greatest challenge facing the government in its peace initiatives would be justifying the devolution of power to the provinces and gaining the Sinhalese support to the peace proposals. The provincial boundaries created by the British in the nineteenth century<sup>18</sup> do not necessarily follow the civilizational fault lines. The presence of Sinhalese and Muslims in most areas of the eastern province and some areas in the northern province makes it more difficult to deal with. Therefore, re-demarcation of provincial boundaries is evidently necessary for any feasible solution. The current proposals indicate re-demarcation of provincial boundaries. This

may address the problem effectively in the minds of the Sinhalese, Tamils, and also the Muslims who constitute a considerable portion of population in the north and in the east. This is a wide leap from the existing constitutional, legal, and practical norms. This change would address the civilizational differences harbored by all the communities in the island, namely, Sinhalese-Buddhists, Tamil-Hindus, and Muslims, while preserving the island's sovereignty. This has been further enhanced by the proposed constitution in which the nature of regional administration described as "indissoluble" providing a safeguard for the continued existence of the nation as one entity, precluding an attempt by a region to make any unilateral variation in the status quo as established by the constitution. It also is flexible in meeting the administrative requirements that may arise with regards to boundaries, in that a provision has been provided for regions to initiate action with regard to alteration of boundaries. This is in the interest of administrative complexity that may prevail due to the dynamic ethnic distribution in the island. However, such alterations are empowered to the parliament, acting upon the requests from a regional administration.

These proposals ensure the sovereignty of the people under three categories: legislative; executive; and judicial. This will maximize the distribution of power to the smallest constituent unit of society, thus maximizing the opportunities available to the people to exercise their power. In the proposed constitution, as in the present constitution, Buddhism is given a foremost place assuring the majority the continuity of the traditional past. This is an essential element to build up the support of the majority Buddhists, who fear being overwhelmed by the Hindu civilization.

Land is another center of attraction for the mass of the population. The government's control over land has been a feature of history under colonial rule. The proposals cater for devolving powers relating to land to regional units. This, however, does not imply the loss of



state authority over land, but involves sharing of such powers. This sharing of authority over land has raised the eyebrows of the some Sinhala leaders. They fear the possibility of extreme restrictions on possessing land in areas that fall under regional administrations. The argument is that such actions by a regional administration may lead to expulsion of Sinhalese from Tamil-dominated areas or vice versa. However, a degree of devolution of power with regards to land will be essential for any solution to be feasible.

In the period after independence, the political culture of the country developed as one that was based more on the demography. The language issue played the most significant role in the political evolution of the country. Although religions played an important role in establishing Sinhalese and Tamil identities, the conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils has not been essentially a clash of religions. The recognition of Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, therefore would address the core of the current strife.

The ethnic conflict has always been the most important element of the Sri Lankan political arena. It has received the attention of all governments in power since Sri Lanka's independence. Since then much has been achieved by way of addressing the grievances of the minorities. But none of those achievements have been substantial enough to placate the minorities, especially the Tamils. The proposed constitutional amendments, however, address some of the key issues related to the civilizational background of the problem. Above all, the act of devolution of power to the lowest levels of the sociopolitical apparatus would hopefully address the perceived relative deprivation of the minorities and lay the foundation to create necessary conditions to evaporate the conflict through evolution.

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 291.

<sup>2</sup>K. M. de Silva, "Regionalism and Decentralization of Power" in *Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance* ed. K. M. de Silva (New Delhi, India: Center for Policy research, 1993), 99-126.

<sup>3</sup>K. M. de Silva, Buddhism, Politics and Violent Ethnic Conflict in Modern Sri Lanka, in *Ethnic Studies Report XI(2)* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, July 1994), 223-258.

<sup>4</sup>Sir Charles Jefferies, *Ceylon: Path to Independence*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 47-57.

<sup>5</sup>K.M de Silva, *Managing Ethnic tension in Multi-Ethnic Societies, Sri Lanka, 1880-1985* (Maryland: Lanham, 1986), 221-225.

<sup>6</sup>K.M de Silva, "Language Problems: The Politics of Language Policy," in *Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance*, ed. K.M. de Silva (New Delhi, India: Center for Policy Research, 1993), 275-303.

<sup>7</sup>G. L. Peiris, News Release, *Legal Text of the Devolution Proposals* (Internet: <http://wheat.symgrp.com/symgrip/srilanka/embassy>, 1996), 2

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>9</sup>The president's vision stated in her Government's policy at the inauguration of a new session of Parliament on 6 January 1995, reads as follows: "Our Government is committed to a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict. We have a vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety and security, where human dignity is valued, and equality of treatment is an accepted norm of public life. We believe that all communities must be given the space to express their identity and to participate fully in the life of the nation, whether it be at national, provincial or local level." (Internet: <http://what.symgrp.com/symgrip/srilanka/embassy>, 1996).

<sup>10</sup>Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, *The draft Constitution of Sri Lanka* presented to the parliament in March 1997 (Internet: <http://wheat.symgrp.com/symgrip/srilanka/embassy>, 1997). 1.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., Chapter one.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Chapter four.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., Chapter three.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., Chapter one.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Huntington, 266.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The research answered the main and subordinate research questions. The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict clearly validates Huntington's theses as presented in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. However, Huntington's argument of Buddhism not forming the core of a civilization does not coincide with the Sri Lankan experience. In Sri Lanka the distinctiveness of the culture is strongly related to Buddhism.

The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is a fault line conflict. As identified during the research, it has many characteristics of a fault line conflict: the conflict is rooted in the identities of people; it is particularistic; it is lengthy and regularly interrupted by truces or agreement; in some instances it has been bloody and vicious; the demands of the separatists are centered more on control of territory than control over people. All these fall under Huntington's category of fault line conflict.<sup>1</sup> However, the causes of violence were found to be extended beyond the conflicting identities of the two civilizations.

Until the polarization that occurred in eleventh century A.D. the two groups lived together in harmony. They had often fought together against foreign invasions. However, the two groups maintained their own cultural heritage. Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu cultures have interacted very well. They have absorbed many traditions and practices from each other. The existence of this harmony lasted only until the emergence of European seafarers who represented a totally different civilization. The gradual absorption of each civilization by the

Western civilization was resisted by the two groups. This resistance was accompanied with the establishment of separate Sinhala and Tamil identities. The two civilizations, Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu, started drifting apart when each tried to establish a strong identity in order to be able to resist the Western civilization forced on them.

The need for establishing identities took a dramatic turn in the nineteenth century with the expansion of the British administration over the island. Each group attempted to project a superior image to the colonial rulers with the intention of gaining more benefits from the administration. This competition ended up building hatred of one another. At the end of the colonial rule, these animosities had grown over generations, thus making the conflict seem inevitable. With independence, these animosities surfaced giving opportunities to political leaders to twist them any way they liked, which they did in order to seize political opportunities.

The civilizational nature of the conflict earned the attention of a "kin country," India, which has the largest Tamil-Hindu population in the world. India initially supported its Tamil kin in the island. India brokered a peace agreement that allowed an Indian peacekeeping force deployment in the island. The Indian attitude changed when the Tamils did not show sufficient interest to be bound by the agreements of India's interests. The response to the Indian intervention by the Sinhalese was dramatic. A Sinhalese youth group *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna* (Peoples Revolutionary Front) popularly known as JVP, used the opportunity presented by the Indian intervention to further their political aspirations of establishing a socialist communist rule in the island. Their struggle received the support of some sections of the Sinhalese society merely because they exploited the presence of a different civilization in the island. Both Sinhalese and Tamil peoples' sentiments against the presence of Indian forces in the island were clearly visible in all sections of society. The vast majority of Tamils stood with

the Sinhala-dominated government to demand Indian troop withdrawals. Although the Tamils identified themselves with Tamils in South India, they resisted the presence of a major Indic-civilization's armed forces in the island.

However, there was a time when the world opinion had sharply turned against the Sinhala-dominated government of Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the July 1983 violence, the international image of the government in particular and the majority community in general was extremely poor. Systematic lobbying by the Tamil expatriates and the sympathy displayed towards the perceived relative deprivation of the Tamils by the foreign press reinforced this further. The role played by India during the pre-Indo-Lanka accord period also contributed to the situation. Today that situation is changing. With the attempts made by the government to solve the problem and the Tamil rebels attitude of nonnegotiation, international opinion is turning slowly but surely in favor of the Sri Lankan government. Essentially, this change is directed at the Tamil rebels. The Tamil community has begun to reject the atrocities of the rebels. Instead, the Tamil general public has shown their preference to identify with the Sri Lankan government, which has proposed a devolution of power to the regions.

The recent political development on the island addresses the characteristics of a cleft country that existed in the island. According to Huntington, in cleft countries the "majority group belonging to one civilization attempts to define the state as its political instrument and to make its language, religion, and symbols those of the state."<sup>2</sup> This was true in the case of independent Sri Lanka. The country was being transformed gradually into a cleft country by some of its postindependence leaders, in order to gain political advantages. The proposed constitutional amendments have taken a giant leap from this cleft country syndrome. This, together with the attitude of the Tamil population in turning down violence and returning from

rebel-held areas to the government-controlled areas, will isolate the rebels, forcing them to either accept the democratic process or face exhaustion through attrition. Either way, the proposed solution will have to stand the test of time.

### Future Study

Ethnic conflicts are not easy to understand. They can be interpreted under different backgrounds. The Sri Lankan conflict has been interpreted in different forms. This study was based on a civilizational approach through a historical survey. There is a great opportunity to explore the conflict and its recent developments in a civilizational approach. The current debate of devolution of power has generated public interest as never before. It generates the public sentiments that are difficult to unearth otherwise. Looking at the devolution proposals along with public sentiments of all sections of society would provide an excellent insight into what the future of the country may look like.

It would be interesting to study the clash between the three civilizations in detail from the sixteenth to the middle of the twentieth century and from the beginning of the Portuguese involvement to the end of the British rule with Ceylon gaining independence in 1945. Although there are a few studies that touch upon this period, they lack civilizational perspectives and the circumstances of their clash. Such a study would shed light on the hitherto uncovered drama of the clash of civilizations on the island. This could be further extended to the period after independence, where locals who grasped the values of the three civilizations, namely Sinhala-Buddhist, Tamil-Hindu, and Western, continued the conflict to protect the values they believed right.

The military aspect of the conflict was not considered in this research. There is no such detailed research conducted on the military aspect of the conflict. Being an ethnic conflict, a

study of the military aspect has always been subordinate to the political and historical aspects. The Sri Lankan Defense forces evolved from a peace-time, ceremonial force with one of the lowest defense budgets in the world in 1970s to a substantially equipped, full-time counterrevolutionary force. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) evolved from a handful of youth with nineteenth-century weapons to a leading terrorist group in the world, equipped with sophisticated weapons with enormous capabilities, especially with the capability to execute suicidal missions at any level. The two-decade-long struggle between the two groups offers the rest of the world a wealth of knowledge on the counterrevolutionary aspects of military operations other than war.

The feeling of the Tamils in the world as a group of people without a motherland deserves a research attempt. This will shed light on the possible desire of the Tamil people scattered all over the world to establish a unified nation. Although such a desire is not expressed openly, the size of the Tamil community and the gradual dominance they gain in countries all over the world have a great potential for future attempts for the establishment of a Tamil nation-state. Having just one regional government, the Tamil-Nadu Province of India, does not seem to have served to eradicate the deprived feelings of the Tamil people. This sense of deprivation has the potential to blow into a large-scale political-military struggle in the future. This could be very controversial, but an interesting subject for a very ambitious study in the future.

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 252-254.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

## APPENDIX A







Figure 1. Source: K. M. de Silva, *Regional Powers and Small States Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), XVI.

Boundary of the Kandyan kingdom as shown on John Davy's map of 1821.

In demarcating this boundary, Davy appears to have followed the specifications of the Kandyan-Dutch treaty of 1766, in preference to the boundary as shown on J. de Peiron's map of 1789.

The pre-British administrative areas are named in lowercase in accordance with the spelling and alignments in Davy's map.






Figure 3. Source: James Jupp, *Sri Lanka--Third World Democracy* (London, UK: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1978).

# தமிழ் விடுதலைப் புலிகள்



Figure. 4. Contours of the Projected State of Tamil-Eelam Published by the LTTE.  
Source: K. M. de Silva, *The Traditional homelands of the Tamils. Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka--A Historical Appraisal* (Kandy, Sri Lanka: The Center for Ethnic Studies, 1994), Fig. 10.

## APPENDIX B

TABLE 1

| PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION-1981 |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
|--|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| by Ethnicity                               |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| District                                   | Sinhalese   | Sri Lanka   | Indian     | Moors      | Burghers   | Malays     | Others     |
|  |             | Tamils      | Tamils     |            |            |            |            |
| <b>Western province</b>                    |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 1. Colombo                                 | 77.9        | 9.8         | 1.3        | 8.3        | 1.1        | 1.1        | 0.5        |
| 2. Gampaha                                 | 92.2        | 3.3         | 0.4        | 2.8        | 0.6        | 0.6        | 0.1        |
| 3. Kalutara                                | 87.3        | 1.0         | 4.1        | 7.5        | 0.0        | 0.1        | 0.0        |
| <b>Southern province</b>                   |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 4. Galle                                   | 94.4        | 0.7         | 1.4        | 3.2        | 0.0        | 0.1        | 0.2        |
| 5. Matara                                  | 94.6        | 0.6         | 2.2        | 2.6        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 6. Hambantota                              | 97.4        | 0.4         | 0.1        | 1.1        | 0.0        | 1.0        | 0.0        |
| <b>Uva province</b>                        |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 7. Monaragala                              | 92.9        | 1.8         | 3.3        | 1.9        | 0.0        | 0.1        | 0.0        |
| 8. Badulla                                 | 68.5        | 5.7         | 21.1       | 4.2        | 0.1        | 0.2        | 0.2        |
| <b>Central province</b>                    |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 9. Kandy                                   | 75.0        | 4.9         | 9.3        | 10.0       | 0.2        | 0.2        | 0.4        |
| 10. Matale                                 | 79.9        | 5.7         | 6.8        | 7.3        | 0.1        | 0.1        | 0.1        |
| 11. Nuwara Eliya                           | 35.9        | 13.5        | 47.3       | 2.8        | 0.1        | 0.2        | 0.2        |
| <b>Sabaragamuwa province</b>               |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 12. Kegalle                                | 86.3        | 2.1         | 6.4        | 5.1        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.1        |
| 13. Ratnapura                              | 84.6        | 2.3         | 11.1       | 1.7        | 0.1        | 0.1        | 0.1        |
| <b>North-Western province</b>              |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 14. Kurunegala                             | 93.1        | 1.1         | 0.5        | 5.1        | 0.0        | 0.1        | 0.1        |
| 15. Puttalam                               | 82.6        | 6.7         | 0.6        | 9.7        | 0.1        | 0.2        | 0.1        |
| <b>Eastern province</b>                    |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 16. Trincomalee                            | 33.6        | 33.8        | 2.6        | 29.0       | 0.5        | 0.3        | 0.2        |
| 17. Batticaloa                             | 3.2         | 70.9        | 1.2        | 23.9       | 0.7        | 0.0        | 0.1        |
| 18. Ampara                                 | 37.7        | 20.1        | 0.4        | 41.4       | 0.2        | 0.1        | 0.1        |
| <b>North-Central province</b>              |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 19. Anuradhapura                           | 91.3        | 1.4         | 0.1        | 7.1        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.1        |
| 20. Polonnaruwa                            | 90.9        | 2.2         | 0.1        | 6.5        | 0.0        | 0.1        | 0.2        |
| <b>Northern province</b>                   |             |             |            |            |            |            |            |
| 21. Jaffna                                 | 0.6         | 95.3        | 2.4        | 1.7        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 22. Mullaitivu                             | 5.1         | 76.0        | 13.9       | 4.9        | 0.1        | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 23. Mannar                                 | 8.1         | 50.6        | 13.3       | 26.6       | 0.0        | 0.0        | 1.4        |
| 24. Vavuniya                               | 16.6        | 56.9        | 19.4       | 6.9        | 0.0        | 0.0        | 0.2        |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>74.0</b> | <b>12.7</b> | <b>5.5</b> | <b>7.0</b> | <b>0.3</b> | <b>0.3</b> | <b>0.2</b> |

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Central Bank Printing Press, 1995), 8.

TABLE 2

| PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION-1981 |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
|--|-------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| by Religion                                |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| District                                   | No. of Persons    | Buddhists   | Hindus      | Muslims    | Christians | Others     |
| <b>Western province</b>                    |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 1. Colombo                                 | 1,698,322         | 70.8        | 7.6         | 10.0       | 11.4       | 0.2        |
| 2. Gampaha                                 | 1,389,490         | 71.1        | 1.9         | 3.4        | 23.5       | 0.1        |
| 3. Kalutara                                | 827,189           | 84.4        | 4.5         | 7.6        | 3.5        | 0.0        |
| <b>Southern province</b>                   |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 4. Galle                                   | 814,579           | 94.1        | 1.8         | 3.2        | 0.6        | 0.3        |
| 5. Matara                                  | 644,231           | 94.6        | 2.4         | 2.6        | 0.4        | 0.0        |
| 6. Hambantota                              | 424,102           | 97.3        | 0.4         | 2.2        | 0.1        | 0.0        |
| <b>Uva province</b>                        |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 7. Monaragala                              | 279,743           | 92.8        | 4.6         | 2.1        | 0.5        | 0.0        |
| 8. Badulla                                 | 642,893           | 68.3        | 25.0        | 4.5        | 2.2        | 0.0        |
| <b>Central province</b>                    |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 9. Kandy                                   | 1,126,296         | 74.4        | 11.9        | 11.2       | 2.3        | 0.2        |
| 10. Matale                                 | 357,441           | 78.7        | 11.6        | 7.4        | 2.3        | 0.0        |
| 11. Nuwara Eliya                           | 522,219           | 35.4        | 55.6        | 3.0        | 5.9        | 0.1        |
| <b>Sabaragamuwa province</b>               |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 12. Kegalle                                | 682,411           | 85.2        | 7.7         | 5.4        | 1.7        | 0.0        |
| 13. Ratnapura                              | 796,468           | 84.6        | 11.9        | 1.9        | 1.6        | 0.0        |
| <b>North-Western province</b>              |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 14. Kurunegala                             | 1,212,755         | 90.4        | 1.1         | 5.3        | 3.2        | 0.0        |
| 15. Puttalam                               | 493,344           | 47.5        | 4.2         | 10.2       | 38.0       | 0.1        |
| <b>Eastern province</b>                    |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 16. Trincomalee                            | 256,790           | 32.4        | 31.8        | 29.5       | 6.0        | 0.3        |
| 17. Batticaloa                             | 330,899           | 2.7         | 66.3        | 24.1       | 6.8        | 0.1        |
| 18. Ampara                                 | 388,786           | 37.2        | 19.1        | 41.6       | 2.0        | 0.1        |
| <b>North-Central province</b>              |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 19. Anuradhapura                           | 587,822           | 90.2        | 1.0         | 7.5        | 1.2        | 0.1        |
| 20. Polonnaruwa                            | 262,753           | 89.9        | 2.0         | 6.7        | 1.3        | 0.1        |
| <b>Northern province</b>                   |                   |             |             |            |            |            |
| 21. Jaffna                                 | 831,112           | 0.5         | 85.2        | 1.7        | 12.6       | 0.0        |
| 22. Mullaitivu                             | 77,512            | 1.3         | 78.3        | 4.9        | 15.5       | 0.0        |
| 23. Mannar                                 | 106,940           | 3.0         | 26.7        | 28.1       | 42.1       | 0.1        |
| 24. Vavuniya                               | 95,904            | 16.5        | 69.3        | 7.1        | 7.1        | 0.0        |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>14,850,001</b> | <b>69.3</b> | <b>15.5</b> | <b>7.6</b> | <b>7.5</b> | <b>0.1</b> |

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka* (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Central Bank Printing Press, 1995), 8.

## APPENDIX C



TABLE 3

APPOINTMENTS FROM THE CEYLON GENERAL CLERICAL SERVICE TO THE  
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTANTS' SERVICE, 1946-1960, AND THE GOVERNMENT  
AUDIT SERVICE, 1948-1960 (BY ETHNICITY IN PERCENTAGE).

| <u>Race</u> | <u>Accountants' Service</u><br>(N=149) | <u>Audit Service</u><br>(N=46) |
|-------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Sinhalese   | 36                                     | 30                             |
| Tamil       | 63                                     | 63                             |
| Other *     | 1                                      | 7                              |
| Total       | 100                                    | 100                            |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 48.

\*Includes Burghers and other Eurasians.

TABLE 4

APPOINTMENTS FROM THE CEYLON GENERAL CLERICAL SERVICE TO THE  
CEYLON CIVIL SERVICE, 1948 - 62 (BY ETHNICITY; IN PERCENTAGE; IN FIVE  
SUCCESSIVE GROUPS; N=123)

| <u>Appointments</u> | <u>Sinhalese</u> | <u>Tamil</u> | <u>Other*</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| First 25            | 48               | 36           | 16            | 100          |
| Second 25           | 48               | 40           | 12            | 100          |
| Third 25            | 56               | 36           | 8             | 100          |
| Fourth 25           | 80               | 8            | 12            | 100          |
| Fifth 25            | 70               | 22           | 9             | 100          |
| Total               | 60               | 28           | 11            | 99**         |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 49.

\* Includes Burghers, Other Eurasians and Muslims.

\*\* Total not equal 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 5

GAZETTED OFFICERS, CEYLON POLICE, 1957  
( BY ETHNICITY AND RELIGION; IN PERCENTAGES; N=69)

| <u>Ethnic Group</u> |     | <u>Religion</u>     |        |
|---------------------|-----|---------------------|--------|
| Sinhalese           | 48  | Buddhist            | 25     |
| Ceylon Tamil        | 19  | Catholic            | 26     |
| Burgher             | 29  | Anglican            | 26     |
| Malay               | 0   | Dutch Reformed      | 13     |
| Moor                | 0   | Hindu               | 6      |
| Other*              | 4   | Other and Unknown** | 6      |
| Total               | 100 | Total               | 101*** |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 57.

\* One Parsee, one Indian Tamil, one mixed Tamil.

\*\* One Wesleyan, one Pentecostal, one Parsee, one unknown.

\*\*\* Total does not equal due to rounding.

TABLE 6

COMMISSIONS AWARDED, CEYLON LIGHT INFANTRY, REGULAR FORCE, 1949-74  
(BY ETHNICITY)

|           | <u>1949-51, 1954</u><br><u>(N=44)</u> | <u>1956-60</u><br><u>(N=25)</u> | <u>1963-69</u><br><u>(N=27)</u> | <u>1972-74</u><br><u>(N=16)</u> |
|-----------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Sinhalese | 55                                    | 44                              | 96                              | 88                              |
| Tamil     | 18                                    | 32                              | 4                               | 12                              |
| Burgher   | 20                                    | 8                               | 0                               | 0                               |
| Muslim*   | 7                                     | 12                              | 0                               | 0                               |
| Unknown   | 0                                     | 4                               | 0                               | 0                               |
| Totals    | 100                                   | 100                             | 100                             | 100                             |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 69.

\* Malays and Moors have been combined for the purpose of the table.

TABLE 7

COMMISSIONS AWARDED, CEYLON LIGHT INFANTRY, REGULAR FORCE, 1949-74  
(BY RELIGIONS)\*

|             | <u>1949-51, 1954</u><br>(N=44) | <u>1956-60</u><br>(N=25) | <u>1963-69*</u><br>(N=27) |
|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Buddhist    | 34                             | 40                       | 89                        |
| Christian** | 59                             | 36                       | 7                         |
| Hindu       | 0                              | 8                        | 0                         |
| Muslim      | 7                              | 12                       | 0                         |
| Unknown     | 0                              | 4                        | 4                         |
| Totals      | 100                            | 100                      | 100                       |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 69.

\* Religion not available after 1969.

\*\* All Christian denominations have been combined for the purpose of the table.

TABLE 8

COMMISSIONS AWARDED, CEYLON ARTILLERY, REGULAR FORCE, 1949-60  
(BY ETHNICITY AND RELIGION; IN PERCENTAGES)  
(BY ETHNIC GROUP)

|           | <u>1949-55 (N=29)</u> | <u>1956-60 (N=9)</u> |
|-----------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Sinhalese | 52                    | 56                   |
| Tamil     | 21                    | 44                   |
| Burgher   | 21                    | 0                    |
| Muslim*   | 0                     | 0                    |
| Other**   | 7                     | 0                    |
| Totals    | 101***                | 100                  |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 70.

\* Malays and Moors have been combined for the purpose of the table.

\*\* Eurasians.

\*\*\* Total do not equal 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 9

COMMISSONS AWARDED, CEYLON ARTILLERY, REGULAR FORCE, 1949-60  
(BY RELIGION)

|            | <u>1949-55 (N=29)</u> | <u>1956-60 (N=9)</u> |
|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Buddhist   | 38                    | 44                   |
| Christian* | 52                    | 22                   |
| Hindu      | 10                    | 33                   |
| Muslims    | 0                     | 0                    |
| Totals     | 100                   | 99**                 |

Source: Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers Motives; Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 70.

\* All Christian denominations have been combined for the purposes of the tables.

\*\* Total do not equal 100 due to rounding.

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